Declining Benefits of Conquest?
Economic Development and Territorial Claims in the Americas and Europe

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Abstract: We analyze the recent debate over the possibility that economic development renders territorial expansion obsolete or inefficient in today's world economy. We identify four competing hypotheses about the possible impact of development. Unlike past studies in this area, we test these hypotheses using territorial claims rather than militarized interstate disputes, in order to capture an important side of territorial expansion that has been overlooked until now. Our results suggest that economic development has not had as great an impact on territorial expansionism as many authors on each side of this debate have argued; development appears to have decreased the origins of territorial claims before World War II, with little impact on claims since then or on the militarization of territorial claims in any era. Results for counter-explanations that emphasize specific types of territory or political democracy are also mixed at best. We conclude by discussing implications of our work for future research in this area.

"The land constitutes by far the greatest, most important, and the most durable part of the wealth of every extensive country."

Adam Smith (1776/2000, p. 277)

"New territories and trades may raise profits even in a country advancing in riches."

Adam Smith (1776/2000, p. 107)

A lively debate in the security studies community addresses whether economic development has rendered military conquest obsolete in the modern world economy. Many scholars have suggested that economic development reduces militarized conflict, typically arguing that trade or development provide states with less costly means of obtaining economic resources than militarized force offers through the conquest of territory (Angell 1914; Rosecrance 1986, 1999; Mousseau 2000). However, most empirical studies on this topic have been unable to address the topic directly, typically examining the relationship between development and militarized conflict in general -- when the primary theoretical concern is with attempts to acquire territory as a means of economic advancement. Armed conflict to replace another state's regime, or to punish another state's support for cross-border rebel groups, is of little relevance to the question of whether development has made territorial gains an inefficient or obsolete means for economic gain.

We argue that the impact of economic development and the benefits of conquest can be studied most appropriately by focusing on territorial claims, where nation-states explicitly seek to acquire specific territory (whether through the use of force or through other means), rather than by including all militarized conflict. As a result, we seek to investigate the effect of economic development on the origins and management of territorial claims, using data on territorial claims from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project.

We begin by reviewing the existing literature on the effects of economic development on conquest, and by specifying the hypotheses associated with the various sides of the debate. We then develop and execute a research design that allows us to test these various hypotheses more appropriately than has been possible with past work in this area. Our results suggest that the conventional wisdom on economic development -- that states tend to seek territorial expansion as they develop -- is not supported by the evidence of the past two centuries. A liberal economic alternative, suggesting that increasing development actually reduces territorial expansionism, is supported for the pre-Cold War era but not for the most recent historical period. There is little evidence that the impact of development on territorial expansion is limited to certain types of territory, as some have suggested, and the impact of political democracy on expansionism seems to vary over time. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for the scholarly debate over development and conquest, and by suggesting directions for future research.

Theoretical Development

The potential relationship between a nation-state's level of economic development and its propensity toward conquest has occupied scholars of international relations for centuries. Over the course of these centuries, a number of general arguments regarding the effect of economic development on territorial conquest have emerged, each of which suggests hypotheses that can be evaluated empirically.

The Conventional Wisdom: Conquest Enriches States

The oldest belief about the relationship between economic development and territorial conquest has its roots in the earliest forms of traditional realism, such as Thucydides (1954) and

Sun Tzu (1988). This line of argument centers on the necessary position that territory holds for a state in achieving and maintaining power. The cultures of both ancient Greece (Thucydides 1954) and ancient China (Sun Tzu 1988; Tin-bor Hui 2004) recognized territorial expansion as a necessary means of increasing economic wealth, power, and security (through the creation of buffer zones and forward basing areas for both land and sea powers).

Beyond the ancient Greeks and Chinese, this belief that territorial expansion was necessary for a state to increase its power formed the "conventional wisdom" for leaders, military strategists, and statesmen prior to the twentieth century (Smith 1776/2000, Angell 1914; Morgenthau 1966). Even liberal economist Adam Smith (1776/2000: 107) recognized the economic benefits of territorial expansion by economically developed states: "[t]he acquisition of new territory, or of new branches of trade, may sometimes raise the profits of stock, and with them, the interest of money, even in a country which is fast advancing in the acquisition of riches."[1] Similarly, Angell (1914: vii) argued that what caused states to fear their neighbors was "the universal assumption that a nation, in order to find outlets for expanding population and increasing industry, or simply to ensure the best conditions possible for its people, is necessarily pushed to territorial expansion and the exercise of political force against others."

This line of argument was also expressed by political realists at the time. Angell (1914: 176) addresses his realist critic Mahan's argument that it was important for America to increase its naval and military power in order to acquire colonial possessions since:

> [c]ommercial and industrial predominance forces a nation to seek markets, and,
> where possible, to control them to its own advantage by preponderating
> force, the ultimate expression of which is possession […] an inevitable link in a
> chain of logical sequences: industry, markets, control, navy bases.

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[1] Admittedly, economies that were considered "advanced" in the eighteenth century were quite different than those that are typically considered advanced in the twenty-first. Nonetheless, this argument here was largely accepted as the conventional wisdom for quite some time.

Five decades later, Morgenthau (1966) noted that territorial expansion as a means for military and economic ends was the conventional wisdom of many leaders and diplomats in the international system, even among developed states. Morgenthau identified the contents of territory -- most notable food supplies and raw materials -- as central components of national power, and argued that it was the need to control access to raw materials that led to the territorial expansion of developed states, especially through the acquisition of colonies. As technology, especially military technology, progresses, the need for raw materials increases, so Morgenthau (1966:115) implies that development leads to territorial expansion due to "the increas[ed] mechanization of warfare, which since the industrial revolution has proceeded at a faster pace than in all preceding history, national power has become more and more dependent upon the control of raw materials in peace and war."

This general expectation is also consistent with arguments such as Choucri and North's lateral pressure theory. Choucri and North (1975, 1989) essentially argued that increases in a state's population and economic development create ever-increasing demands for scarce resources. Once these resource demands outstrip the domestic supply, the state may be forced to acquire them elsewhere -- perhaps through the acquisition of new territory or colonies. Choucri and North's initial research on the great powers before World War I revealed some evidence of such a pattern, particularly with respect to colonial expansion, although Zuk (1985) found less support when considering these powers' supplies of and demands for specific resources.

This conventional wisdom can be summarized in our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (Conventional Wisdom): *Increasing economic development increases the likelihood that a state will pursue territorial expansion.*

Challenge #1: Conquest is Inefficient for Developed States

Numerous scholars have challenged the conventional wisdom on development from a liberal political and economic perspective. This perspective generally suggests that development, rather than pushing states to expand outward, actually has a pacifying effect. This impact of economic development on conflict stems not from what economically developed states stand to gain from conquest (as in the above arguments), but instead from what developed states potentially lose by embarking on expansion and conquest. Liberal scholars argue that military conquest is an inefficient and costly means for a state to achieve economic resources, and that economically developed states can achieve wealth more efficiently through other strategies such as increased trade or economic interdependence (Angell 1914; Rosecrance 1986).

For example, Angell (1914: viii) argued that:

> […] military power is socially and economically futile, and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; that it is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another – to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another; that in short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive. […] Thus the wealth of conquered territory remains in the hands of the population of such territory.

Angell (1914: 27-30) offered six "theorems" to explain the futility of military conquest for economic gains: (1) a state cannot destroy the international trade of a competing state, because destroying a competitor also destroys a (potential) buyer; (2) war causes the destruction of financial markets and capital flight; (3) a conqueror can not exact tribute from a conquered people, especially those of another developed state, due to nationalism; (4) the conqueror is unable to absorb the trade of the conquered state, nor can it fare better in international economic competition; (5) political power does not condition economic wealth – otherwise small states such as Belgium and the Netherlands would not be wealthy; and (6) colonies cannot be owned but are instead independent nations – attempting to control colonies is too costly.

More recently, Rosecrance (1986) argues that states can either use military force or economic policies to achieve economic goals. Lesser-developed states will find it less costly to resort to force than developed states, since developed states could lose potential gains from trade and interdependence. Rosecrance (1986) argues that once a state reaches a certain level of development, it becomes a "trading state" – abandoning the use of militarized force as a strategy of achieving economic goals, and resorting instead to trading relationships and interdependence (although not always in a cooperative fashion) to achieve economic ends.[2] Furthermore, Angell (1914: 74) argues, military power and conquest are useless to developed states because:

> [The Market] is a place where things are bought and sold, and one operation
> is impossible without the other […] As between economically highly-organized
> nations a customer must also be a competitor, a fact which bayonets cannot alter.
> To the extent to which they destroy him as a competitor, they destroy him,
> speaking generally, and largely as a customer.

This liberal line of argument is reflected in the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 (Liberal): Increasing economic development reduces the likelihood that states will pursue territorial expansion.

Challenge #2: Economic versus Strategic Benefits of Conquest

A relatively recent development in this debate is the argument that economic development is different in the post World War II era due to higher levels of technology, communication, and improvement in human capital. Developed states begin to move into a post-industrial phase of development, where they surpass the "trading state" to become "virtual states." Land is not a necessary or even important factor of production for the "virtual state," but instead capital mobility and highly skilled labor are the most important, especially in the sectors

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[2] To both Angell and Rosecrance, the success of "trading states" like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland demonstrated the uselessness of military force (since these countries did not possess any large standing army or navy) and political power in favor of economic power in the forms of trade and finance.

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of research and development and information technology (Rosecrance, 1999). These sectors of the economy cannot be easily taken by occupying a territory, especially since labor and capital are highly mobile in the "virtual state" (Rosecrance 1999).

Brooks (1999) argues similarly that the "globalization of production" resulting from high levels of economic development makes conquest for economic goals futile. Brooks (1999) argues that developed states locate links in the chain of production within different nation-states. No longer is it common for a country to be entirely self-sufficient in the production of all or most of its industrial goods. Brooks (1999) argues that even though Liberman (1993, 1996) provided compelling evidence for the benefits of conquering a developed state, such a conqueror, whether ruthless or not, would not find much use in taking a territory by force to gain industrial plants that can only produce parts to an industrial good that is finished in another country.

In short, some claim that economic development renders the use of military force and conquest obsolete, for *economic gains*. This is not the same as the all-encompassing idealist view of earlier liberal scholars, such as Angell (1914). These contemporary liberal scholars generally accept that militarized force is still relevant for less-developed states, and may be relevant for certain purposes even among developed states. Instead, land (and the primary goods that can be extracted from it) is no longer an important factor of production for highly developed states; because of this declining utility for land, developed states will not engage in the costly use of force to obtain economically important territory (Brooks 1999; Rosecrance 1999). However, developed states might still become involved in disputes over territory -- and might even resort to military force in these disputes -- for ethnic, strategic, or other reasons (Rosecrance 1999).

These arguments are reflected in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3 (Type of Territory): *Increasing economic development reduces the likelihood of pursuing territorial expansion with respect to economically valuable territory, although not for other territory.*

Challenge #3: Regime Type and The Efficiency of Conquest

The liberal perspective on development is not without its own critics,. Particularly in the past decade, a number of scholars have argued that conquest can indeed be an effective source of riches, even in today's world economy (e.g., Liberman 1993, 1996, 2000; Brooks 1999; Mastanduno 2000; Tin-Bor Hui 2004). For example, Liberman (1993, 1996, 2000) uses comparative case studies to reveal the success that developed states, especially Nazi Germany, have had in conquering, occupying, and extracting resources from other developed states. Liberman (1993, 1996, 2000), Mastanduno (2000) and Brooks (1999) argue that economic development alone does not necessarily prevent conquest, and in fact, may make conquest easier if a state is highly developed. Liberman (1996) goes further to argue that industrialized, developed states can pose tempting targets for conquest to countries that have the capacity to conquer such countries.

The capacity that is necessary to exploit developed states, these scholars argue, is the conqueror's willingness to use cruel and ruthless tactics (Liberman 1993, 1996, 2000; Mastanduno 2000; Tin-Bor Hui 2004). Only conquerors willing to implement ruthless tactics in suppressing rebellions (due to nationalism) and strikes (which lower productivity) are capable of exploiting a developed state. For these types of conquerors, the very factors of economic development that liberals argue make conquest harder (communications technology and specialized labor forces) can make occupation and exploitation easier for the occupier by

lowering the costs of surveillance and repression (Liberman 1996). Additionally, Liberman (1996) argues that a developed state, with a highly specialized labor force (one that is not tied to the land), can be easy for a ruthless leader to keep productive by controlling the food supply, therefore creating a "work or starve" atmosphere.

This line of argument suggests that economic development on its own does not prevent conquest, but that a state's regime type makes an important difference. A highly developed country under the leadership of a ruthless dictator would be much more likely to engage in territorial expansion than an equivalent leader in a democratic political system, which would be less likely to take the ruthless actions that would be needed for success. This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4 (Regime Type): *Political democracy, rather than economic development, reduces the likelihood that states will pursue territorial expansion.*

Previous Research Findings

Past research has offered varying levels of support for the above hypotheses. Previous quantitative studies have found that higher levels of economic development -- both alone and in combination with other factors such as trade -- reduce the probability of militarized conflict between two states (Mandel 1980; Tir and Diehl 1998; Hegre 2000a, 2000b; Mousseau 2000). Additionally, several studies suggest that the pacifying effect of economic development is conditional on democracy (Mousseau et al, 2003) or the level of industrialization versus specialization in services (Hegre 2000b). Even though most of these studies have tended to support the liberal arguments, they suffer from several limitations that we attempt to overcome.

One important limitation of the existing research on this topic is its restricted spatial-temporal domain. Most quantitative studies (e.g., Hegre 2000a, 2000b; Mousseau 2000) focus on the post-World War II period. This limitation is necessary due to data restrictions, as few reliable figures can be found for trade or development in earlier periods. Yet this time frame is largely limited to the Cold War era, leading to questions about whether the observed results are really an artifact of the Cold War, bipolarity, the nuclear era, or a unique phase in the world economy -- echoing criticism of early work on the democratic peace (see Farber and Gowa, 1995). We attempt to extend the study of development back to a much earlier period, in order to acquire as complete an understanding of development and territorial expansionism as possible.

Another limitation with existing research is the dependent variable. For example, Mousseau (2000, 2003) and Hegre (2000a) examine the outbreak of militarized interstate disputes between two adversaries. While the resulting analyses can tell us much about the influence of development, trade, democracy, or other factors on patterns of militarized conflict in general, they are unable to address the debate over the declining value of territorial conquest. Militarized disputes can arise for many reasons that have nothing to do with territorial conquest; examples include attempts to overthrow a neighboring regime, pursuit of rebels across a border, or a variety of non-territorial demands on another state.[3]

A step in the right direction is a recent study by Hegre (2000b), who focuses on militarized disputes over territorial issues (as measured by the COW project's Militarized Interstate Dispute data set). This approach rightly excludes militarized disputes that did not involve territorial issues, which is a great improvement -- but it still excludes attempts to acquire territory through non-militarized means. While both scholars and leaders should be most

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[3] In Mousseau's defense, he was not specifically testing the effects of development on territorial conquest, but rather seeking to explain the pacifying effects of development, in general, as it relates to the broader democratic peace literature. This does limit the extent to which his findings are relevant to the present debate, though.

concerned with militarized conflict, the underlying theoretical debate here is over attempts to expand one's territory, and even peaceful attempts to do so should be relevant to evaluating the impact of development in the modern world economy. In the rest of this paper, we consider all attempts to acquire territory (whether through peaceful or militarized means), arguing that this approach should offer the most meaningful evaluation of the hypotheses specified above.

Research Design

We evaluate the above hypotheses using data drawn from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project on territorial claims (Hensel 2001, 2003). A territorial claim involves explicit statements by official government representatives of at least one nation-state claiming sovereignty over territory that is currently owned or administered by at least one other nation-state. Table 1 presents a list of all qualifying claims to territory in the Americas and Western Europe between 1816-2001, which are used in the analyses in this paper.

Dependent Variables

Analyses are run at the nation-state and dyadic levels of analysis. The state level begins with all states in the Americas and Western Europe, as identified by the Correlates of War (COW) project's interstate system membership list, and is used to test hypotheses regarding the development level of states and their propensity to begin territorial claims. The dyadic level of analysis examines the behavior of states during such territorial claims, focusing on their propensity to use militarized conflict to achieve their claim-related goals.

The first state-level dependent variable, used in Tables 2 and 3, is the initiation of a territorial claim. This dichotomous variable indicates whether or not a given nation-state began a

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new ICOW territorial claim during the year of observation. To avoid muddling the results by including cases where a given state was the target of a claim by another state -- which have little to do with a fair evaluation of the development thesis examined in this paper -- we only code this for claims where the state acts as the claim challenger, or the state that seeks to acquire territory that is currently owned and/or administered by the target state.

A second state-level dependent variable -- also used in Tables 2 and 3 -- is a subset of the first, and refers only to the origins of a claim to territory with economic value. The ICOW project has collected data on numerous attributes of claimed territories, one of which is the presence of valuable economic resources on the territory in question (or at least the belief by the claimants that such resources are present). Such resources represent the sort of economic value that is relevant in the scholarly literature being examined here, so claims with this economic value are examined separately from the larger population of all territorial claims, in order to test Hypothesis 3.

The third and final dependent variable, used in Tables 4 and 5, is dyadic and measures the militarization of an ongoing territorial claim. This variable is based on the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Jones, Bremer, & Singer, 1996). Hensel (2003) obtained the MID3 data on all militarized disputes and adapted it for consistency with the ICOW territorial claims data, by examining historical sources for every MID that occurred between two states that were involved in an ICOW territorial claim. Each MID was then coded to identify whether or not it involved an attempt to alter the status quo for this particular territorial claim. In many cases, the COW coding for territorial revisionism was correct, but in other cases the COW coding referred to a different claim (such as a claim to territory in a different region or a different portion of the same border) or to a situation that ICOW does not code as a territorial claim (such as a maritime issue)

and a few cases turned out to involve explicit territorial issues that were not coded by COW. As a result, there is some difference between this ICOW coding of MID issues and the official COW coding, but we are confident that this gives the most accurate depiction of the connection between territorial issues and militarized conflict that is currently available. The dependent variable in Tables 4 and 5 uses this modified MID data to indicate for each year of each ongoing territorial claim whether the claimants became involved in at least one militarized dispute over that specific territorial claim during the year of observation.

Independent Variables

We use the economic development of each state as the key independent variable for this paper. Where our analyses call for a continuous measure of development, this variable is measured as the total energy consumption per capita for each state in the Americas and Western Europe. The energy consumption and total population data to calculate this measure were obtained from the COW project's National Material Capabilities data set. While energy consumption per capita is not a perfect measure of development, for most of the period of our study it measures the energy demands by both industry and consumers, which are both closely associated with a developed economy; this measure is also highly correlated with more traditional measures of development such as GDP per capita.[4]

Several of our analyses require the creation of a dichotomous version of the development measure. Because of the changing nature of the world economy, it is impossible to create a

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[4] While the traditional measure of economic development is GDP per capita, we use energy consumption per capita. We chose this measure since data on energy consumption from the COW project were available for a greater time span than data on GDP per capita. COW energy consumption data are available for most states throughout their period of membership in the COW interstate system (dating back to 1816), while GDP data are not available for most states in the 19th century at all or (in many cases) until after World War II. Perhaps the most comprehensive collection of GDP data, that collected by Angus Maddison (2003), is missing data for thousands of annual observations that are available in the COW energy data, although their results are highly correlated (r = .86) across the entire span of the COW interstate system. Tir and Diehl (1998) used energy consumption for a similar purpose.

single threshold of development that could accurately measure the development levels of states in both the early 19th and late 20th centuries; a useful threshold for the latter period would identify no state as developed for broad swaths of history, while a threshold for the earlier period would identify nearly all states as developed in recent years. As a result, we used three different thresholds, increasing over time as the world economy advanced. A state is coded dichotomously as being developed if its energy consumption per capita ratio is at least 1.0 for observations between 1816-1899, at least 2.0 for observations between 1900-1945, and at least 3.0 for observations after 1945.[5]

In order to evaluate Hypothesis 4, which suggests that political regime type plays a more important role than economic development, we measure the level of democracy of each state. This variable is measured using the Polity (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995) index of institutionalized democracy. This measure is a score between 0 and 10 that accounts for various aspects of democratic regimes; following general practice in the international relations literature, we code states as democratic if their value on this index is six or greater. For the multivariate analysis in Table 5, we code this measure as joint democracy within the dyad rather than just the challenger state, indicating whether or not both states meet this threshold as political democracies.

In the multivariate analyses of claim origins (presented in Table 3), we control for the effects of two other variables besides development and democracy. First, we consider each state's total population, which is important to lateral pressure theory as a factor influencing expansion (see Choucri and North 1975, 1999; Tir and Diehl 1998). This variable is taken directly from the COW National Material Capabilities data set. Furthermore, we consider the relative militarization of each state, using the COW capabilities data to divide its military

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[5] This procedure produces a list with high face validity for much of the historical era, with the exception that oil producing states are misleadingly coded as developed (in the Americas and Western European regions examined in the present paper, this involves Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago).

personnel by its total population. It might reasonably be expected that a state with a high militarization value would be more prone to territorial expansion for reasons besides economic development, so we control for this factor in order to avoid drawing a misleading conclusion about the impact of development.

The multivariate analyses of militarization in Table 5 use several additional independent variables. The first is relative capabilities, which have been suggested by a variety of research to play an important role in decisions to use militarized force. Following Hensel (2001), we use two dummy variables to identify several categories of relative capabilities, based on the relationship between the challenger and target state in a given territorial claim. Using each state's CINC (Composite Index of National Capabilities) index as provided by the COW capabilities data set, if the stronger claimant has less than three times the overall capabilities of the weaker, the adversaries are coded as roughly equal, which is indicated with one dummy variable. A second dummy indicates whether the challenger is substantially stronger than the target state (i.e., greater than a 3:1 advantage in overall capabilities), leaving out the referent category where the target state is substantially stronger than the challenger.

The second independent variable we use is that of territory salience. We use the ICOW salience index (Hensel 2001) to measure the salience of the territory involved in each claim. The index for salience has a range in value from 0-12, with twelve being the most salient (possessing all six salience indicators for each state) and zero being the lowest (Hensel 2001). We expect that salience will have a positive effect on the likelihood of a MID between two states engaged in a territorial claim, as seen in recent research on this topic (Hensel 2001).

Finally, the militarization analyses in Table 5 will employ a binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) approach, so we include three natural cubic splines and a variable for "peace

years" (years since the last militarized dispute within the current claim) to control for the temporal dependence inherent in cross-section-time-series models (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Tucker 1999). As Beck, Katz, and Tucker argue, many earlier analyses relying on logit models could not account for the temporal dependence of their data, and therefore had standard errors of their coefficients that were highly underestimated producing invalid inferences. A BTSCS model that incorporates cubic splines and a temporal dependence control variable alleviates the problems with estimating time-series-cross-section models with binary dependent variables.

Empirical Analysis

In this section, we report the results from our empirical analyses. We begin with both crosstabs and multivariate state-level analyses on the relationship between economic development and the origin of territorial claims in the Americas and Western Europe from 1816-2001. We then present both crosstabs and multivariate dyadic-level analyses on the relationship between economic development and the militarization of territorial claims.

We split the data analysis into two historical eras: 1816-1945 and 1946-2001. This offers several benefits. First, the latter period overlaps with most past research on this general topic, which allows for a more direct comparison of our results with past work. Perhaps more important, though, this temporal disaggregation allows us to determine whether the impact of development has changed over time with the world economy. As discussed earlier, scholars such as Rosecrance have argued that the post-WWII era has seen the emergence of trading states and ultimately virtual states, as the world economy has changed substantially. If these arguments are correct, then there should be a qualitative difference in the nature of economic development between the late twentieth century and in the early nineteenth century, and a corresponding

qualitative difference in the impact of this development on international behavior; aggregated analyses across this entire period would be unlikely to produce meaningful results.

State-Level Analysis of Claim Origins

Table 2 presents a series of crosstabs to address the relationship between economic development and the origin of territorial claims. This table is divided into three sections, each of which is relevant to one or more of our hypotheses. Table 2A focuses on development and all territorial claims, and is meant to address Hypotheses 1 and 2. Table 2B focuses on development and claims to economically valuable territory only, and is meant to address Hypothesis 3. Finally, Table 2C focuses on political democracy and economically valuable territorial claims, and is meant to address Hypothesis 4.

As Table 2A reveals, between 1816-1945, there were a total of 3469 state-years in the Americas and Western Europe in which states could have begun territorial claims. States began new claims in 112 of these years (with multiple claims beginning in some years), including 13 of the 425 years when states were considered developed (3.1%) and 99 of 3044 less developed (3.3%). This difference in the probability of beginning a new claim is not statistically significant ($p < .83$). The results are similar for the 1946-2001 period, when new claims began in 1.0% of all years for developed states and 0.7% of all years for less developed states; these results are far from statistical significance ($p < .44$). These results do not support either the realist hypothesis that economic development increases territorial expansion or the liberal hypothesis that development decreases the likelihood for expansion (Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively).

Table 2B attempts to examine Hypothesis 3, which suggests that economic development only prevents claims to economically valuable territory. As this table shows, economic

development has no significant impact on whether a claim is made on an economically valuable territory or not, regardless of the time period ($p < .36$ and $p < .25$, respectively). This result is similar to the first portion of the table, and does not support Hypothesis 3 any more than Table 1A supported Hypotheses 1 or 2. These results must be taken with caution, though. These results are only for claims to territory located in the Americas and Western Europe and do not include any claims to territory in Africa, Asia, or the Middle East -- which likely undercounts the number of claims that were made (both overall and to economically valuable territories). The results may change substantially once data collection for these other regions is completed, although we can not say with certainty what impact this will have on the direction of the relationship; while the relatively few developed states in nineteenth century Europe likely began numerous claims to economically valuable territory in Africa and elsewhere, other European colonizers such as Belgium, Portugal, and Spain were not considered developed at the time of their colonial expansion.

Table 2C helps assess the relationship between political democracy and the origin of territorial claims. Hypothesis 4 suggested that democratic states should be less likely to initiate territorial claims, but this table indicates that democratic states were significantly *more* likely to initiate territorial claims between 1816-1945 ($p < .01$), while there is no statistical difference between democratic and non-democratic states after 1945 ($p < .57$). This is inconsistent with the hypothesis in both eras.

Next, we move on to multivariate analyses at the state level of analysis to determine the effects of economic development on the origins of territorial claims. Table 3 reports the results from logit analyses, both for territorial claims in general (Table 3A) and claims to economically

valuable territory (Table 3B). As with Table 2, each analysis is disaggregated into the 1816-1945 and 1946-2001 periods.

Regarding the origin of any territorial claims, Table 3A reveals that the development of the challenger is both negative and significant (p < .01) in the period of 1816-1945, but not in the period 1946-2001. This would suggest that economic development, ceteris paribus, *decreased* the likelihood that a challenger would make a territorial claim in the period of 1816-1945, but not after (when the coefficient was positive but not significant). With respect to substantive significance, based on the coefficient for development pre-1946, for each unit increase in development, a challenger would have been .56 times as likely to initiate a claim, all else being held constant. Based on these results, Hypothesis 1 is not supported for either time period, but Hypothesis 2 is supported for 1816-1945.

Political democracy has had different effects on territorial claims over the two different time periods. In the period 1816-1945, democracy of the challenger was both positive and significant (p < .01), suggesting that the more democratic a challenger was, the more likely it would be to make a territorial claim. In fact, holding all else constant, an increase of one point on the democracy score of a challenger, pre-1946, would result in that challenger being 2.46 times as likely to initiate a territorial claim. This evidence suggests that we should reject Hypothesis 4 for the period of 1816-1945. However, in the post-1945 era, Hypothesis 4 is generally supported, since the coefficient is negative and reaches minimal levels of statistical significance (p < .10).[6] In the post-1945 era, an increase of one point on the democracy score, all else constant, makes a state .40 times as likely to initiate a territorial claim.

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[6] The significance of democracy in Model 2 might be questioned, though, since the overall model has a poor fit (Chi-Square 5.65, 4 d.f., p < .23).

Finally, Table 3A indicates that a state's total population significantly increases its likelihood of beginning a territorial claim (p < .01) for the period 1816-1945, although it does not have a systematic impact after 1945. This suggests that at least until the Cold War, population had a positive effect on territorial expansion, consistent with lateral pressure theory. A state's militarization level (measured by the proportion of the population in the military) does not have a significant impact in either era.

Table 3B examines the effects of the same independent variables on the origin of claims to economically valuable territory only, in order to evaluate Hypothesis 3. Economic development has a negative and significant coefficient for the pre-1946 era (p < .01), and a positive but insignificant coefficient for the post-1945 era. These results support Hypothesis 3 for the pre-1946 era only, in that economic development had a negative effect on economically valuable territorial claims. By looking at economically valuable territory in Western Europe and the Americas only, we see that a unit change in the energy consumption per capita of a potential challenger made it .54 times as likely to initiate a claim for economically valuable territory, all else being constant. Again, this sample does not include claims on the continents of Africa or Asia, so these results may severely underrepresent the actual number of claims.

As before, democracy has a positive and significant coefficient for the pre-1946 era (p < .01), but an insignificant coefficient for the post-1945 era. These results provide evidence to reject Hypothesis 4 for both of the time periods in this analysis. Lastly, we find that population, again, has a positive and significant coefficient for the pre-1946 era (p < .10), but not a significant coefficient for the post-1945 era. None of the variables reach conventional levels of statistical significance for the post-1945 era, likely due to the small number of claims to

economically valuable territory in these regions since World War II, and the overall model performs poorly ($X^2 = 4.20$, 4 d.f., p < .38).

Dyadic-Level Analysis of Claim Militarization

Many scholars, especially those in the security studies arena (and most research on this topic so far), are more concerned with militarized conflict than with diplomatic disagreements over territory. It is this topic to which we turn next. Table 4 presents a series of crosstabs showing the relationship between economic development and democracy of the challenger in a territorial claim and the militarization of those claims, following the same divisions as Table 2 to test the same hypotheses.

As Tables 4A and 4B reveal, there is no statistically significant association between the economic development of the challenger and militarization of territorial claims, whether we examine all claims or only those with economic value, and whether we look at claims before or after 1945. These results do not provide any support for Hypotheses 1, 2, or 3. However, Table 4C does reveal support for Hypothesis 4, on the pacifying effects of democracy. Between 1816-1945 era, territorial claims with democratic challengers were less likely to experience militarized conflict (p < .001), with claims to economically valuable territory experiencing such conflict in 1.6% of all years -- as compared to 4.6% of all years in claims with non-democratic challengers. This relationship does not hold for the post-1945 era.

Table 5 offers a multivariate analysis of economic development and the militarization of territorial claims, using binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) models (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998; Tucker, 1999) for each of the two time periods.[7] While examining the effects of

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[7] The BTSCS analyses are estimated in Stata version 8 using the BTSCS utility developed by Tucker (1999). BTSCS models were chosen over standard logit models due to the results of LR tests, as suggested by Beck, Katz,

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development and democracy on the militarization of territorial claims, we include the control variables of relative capabilities of the challenger and the salience of the claimed territory, as well as controlling for temporal dependence with the peace years variable and the cubic splines of the BTSCS model. The results indicate that neither economic development nor democracy have a significant effect on the militarization of territorial claims for both time periods, when we consider these other factors and the possibility of temporal dependence. The coefficients for both of these variables are negative (as expected by Hypothesis 2 and 4) but not significant.

The results of Table 5 suggest that variables associated with the adversaries' relative capabilities and the issues under contention have more of an impact on whether states choose to use military force in settling territorial claims than either democracy or economic development. Rough parity (less than a 3:1 ratio between the relative capabilities of the stronger and weaker side in the dyad) had a positive and significant effect on the militarization of territorial claims (p < .01). All else being equal, militarized conflict over an ongoing territorial claim is 2.12 time more likely in rough parity between 1816-1945, and 4.31 times more likely since 1945. At least in the post-1945 era, conflict is also significantly more likely (p < .10) when the claim's challenger is substantially stronger than the target state.

The salience of the claimed territory has a positive and significant coefficient for the pre-1946 era (p < .01), consistent with the expectations of the issues approach to international politics (Hensel 2001). An increase of one point on the 0-12 salience scale for the territory being claimed would be 1.23 times as likely to witness a militarized dispute, all else being constant. The coefficient for salience is not significant in the post-1945 era but does have a positive sign.

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and Tucker (1998). The BTSCS models reported here are random effects logit models, rather than fixed effects. While some (e.g. Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001) advocate the use of fixed effects discrete choice models, we adopted random effects as Beck and Katz (2001) argue, since many of the cases would be dropped from analysis in a fixed effects model due to perfect prediction (with the fixed effect explaining everything).

Lastly, the peace years variable -- which counts the number of years since the most recent militarized dispute within the territorial claim in question -- is negative and significant ($p < .01$) in both models. What this reveals is that for every year without a militarized dispute between a pair of states involved in a territorial claim, the states would be .75 and .78 times as likely to become involved in a militarized dispute, respectively.

Discussion

Taken together, this paper's empirical analyses offer mixed support at best for most of the competing hypotheses regarding the effects of economic development on territorial expansion. Hypothesis 1 encapsulated the conventional wisdom -- argued by such divergent sources as Adam Smith, Hans Morgenthau, and Choucri and North -- that states will be more likely to expand territorially as they develop economically. This hypothesis was not supported by any of our analyses, either for the 1816-1945 or 1946-2001 periods. At least with respect to claimed territory in the Americas and Western Europe, development never has a significant and positive effect on either the origins of territorial claims or the militarization of ongoing claims.

Hypothesis 2 suggested the opposite, drawing from liberal economic arguments that development in the modern world economy makes states less likely to pursue territorial expansionism. Our analyses offered greater support for this hypothesis, as economic development significantly decreased the likelihood that a state would begin a territorial claim in the 1816-1945 period. Development has not had a significant impact on beginning claims since World War II, though, which is the period when most liberal arguments would expect the negative effect to be strongest. Furthermore, development has not had a systematic impact on the militarization of territorial claims in either time period.

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Similarly, Hypothesis 3 suggested that development should reduce territorial expansionism with respect to economically valuable territory, although not for other territories. The results for this hypothesis were mixed, with development significantly reducing the beginning of claims up to 1945, but no systematic impact after that time. This mirrors the results for Hypothesis 2 on territorial claims in general, suggesting that development has not had a meaningfully different impact on claims to different types of territory.

Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggested that economic development does not reduce territorial expansionism, but that political democracy does. This hypothesis is not supported for the pre-Cold War era, when democracy significantly increased the likelihood that a given state would begin a new territorial claims, and democracy did not have a systematic impact on the militarization of ongoing claims. Democracy has reduced territorial claims somewhat since World War II, though, suggesting that this hypothesis may hold for the most recent historical era (indeed, when its proponents would argue that its impact should have been greatest).

An important caveat to bear in mind while considering our results is the limited data on territorial claims, since for now we only analyze claims to territory in Western Europe and the Americas between 1816-2001. We have not studied claims to territory located in Africa, Asia, or the Middle East, because ICOW data collection for those regions is not yet complete. Once these regions are included in the data set, we anticipate changes in some, if not all, of these results. Most notable would be the results pertaining to economically valuable territory. We expect that the continents of Africa and Asia will add many more claims by developed states to economically valuable territory during the "scramble for Africa" and the colonial era more generally, which may weaken or reverse the finding that development reduced territorial expansionism in that era.

As we have emphasized throughout, this paper has taken an exploratory approach by testing the theories presented in the literature on economic development and territorial conquest. As with any exploratory project, this one suggests a number of promising directions for future research, several of which we now discuss. One potentially promising direction involves a focus on specific economic needs that might push states toward territorial expansion. For example, Klare (2001) posits that liberals may only be partially correct in assuming that raw materials are not worth engaging in militarized conflict, and that certain raw materials -- notably oil, natural gas, and water -- may be worth the costs and risks of military conflict even for highly developed states. While the ICOW data set does not currently identify which specific resources are located within economically valuable territory holds, or the quantity of each resource that is believed to be present, further research could benefit from examining this subject in greater detail.[8]

A second direction for future research involves the addition of international trade data. A lively debate in international relations journals over the past decade has examined the possible pacifying (or exacerbating) effects of trade on conflict. Unfortunately, this debate has often witnessed contrary results that vary across studies depending on the specific data sets, trade measures, or decisions regarding missing data. This debate -- with all of its nuances and specific disagreements to address -- lies beyond the scope of the present paper, but it would be worth considering in a follow-up study.[9]

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[8] Along these lines, it is quite possible that a focus on individual resources could lead to different conclusions than the aggregated analyses that we have presented here. For example, Zuk's (1985) analysis of specific resources provided substantially less support for the lateral pressure thesis than Choucri and North's more general approach.
[9] A preliminary analysis was done for the militarization of any territorial claim using trade data from O'Neal and Russett (1999) and GDP per capita data from Maddison (2003). The results of this BTSCS random effects analysis did not change the results substantially; we found that the dependence of trade of the challenger has a negative and significant effect, while GDP per capita and the dependence of the target on trade were not significant. Salience and rough parity were both positive and significant, while joint democracy was negative and not significant. However, these results should be taken with caution for a number of reasons, such as the loss in observations due to the number of missing values and limited temporal domain resulting from the trade and development data.

Another issue worth considering is the joint advancement of economic development and weapons technology. Some have argued that the increasing destructive power of modern weapons systems has rendered territorial conquest inefficient even for strategic military reasons. For example, Zacher (2001) posits that highly developed states have highly developed military technological capabilities – aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, jet fighters, cruise missiles, and long range ballistic missiles – that makes the occupation of territory for forward basing and artillery positions less important. Similarly, Waltz (1979) claims that the military technology of the most developed of the states, mainly the great powers, makes the use of force for conquest highly unlikely, since the costs of war for highly developed states is too high to pay for a slight change in the status quo. Waltz (1979: 191) argues that when a state reaches a certain level of development (power) that it no longer seeks to increase its territory through conquest, but instead wishes only to maintain the status quo. It may be, then, that advances in military technology should also serve to decrease the likelihood that states will pursue territorial expansion. This possibility will be difficult to test in any meaningful way, though, and in any case it is beyond the scope of the present paper -- but it would nonetheless be a promising avenue for future research to consider.

In short, we believe that we have introduced a useful new approach to the study of economic development and territorial expansionism. We are not willing to argue that we have provided the final word on this matter; some of the conclusions from this preliminary study may change after including claims to territory in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. There are also other avenues for research to produce a more complete understanding of economics and expansionism, focusing on such factors as trade levels or military technology. But we do expect

that this study's approach will ultimately offer a better answer to the impact of development than

has been possible with existing work on this topic.

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Table 1: ICOW Territorial Claims in the Americas and Western Europe, 1816-2001

Claim	Participants	Dates
North America		
Passamaquoddy Bay	USA - UK	1816 - 1817
St. Croix - St. John Rivers	USA - UK	1816 - 1842
Machias Seal Island	USA - Canada	1971 -
49th Parallel	USA - UK	1816 - 1818
Oregon Country	USA - UK	1816 - 1846
& Haro Channel	USA - Spain	1816 - 1821
	Spain - UK	1816 - 1821
	USA - UK	1846 - 1872
Alaska	Russia - UK	1821 - 1867
	USA – Russia	1822 – 1867
	UK - USA	1872 - 1903
Wrangel Island	Canada - USA	1922 - 1924
	Canada - Russia	1922 - 1924
Labrador	Canada - UK	1920 - 1927
Florida	USA - Spain	1816 - 1821
Texas	USA - Spain	1816 - 1821
	USA - Mexico	1831 - 1848
Mesilla Valley	USA - Mexico	1850 - 1854
Morteritos & Sabinitos	Mexico - USA	1884 - 1884
Río Grande Bancos	Mexico - USA	1884 - 1972
& El Chamizal	Mexico - USA	1895 - 1963
California - New Mexico	USA - Mexico	1835 - 1848
Fort Ross	Spain - Russia	1816 - 1821
	Mexico - Russia	1831 - 1841
Baja California - Sonora	USA - Mexico	1847 - 1865
Ellesmere Island	Canada - USA	1922 - 1926
Sverdrup Islands	Canada - Norway	1922 - 1930
Hans Island	Canada - Denmark	1971 -
Eastern Greenland	Norway - Denmark	1921 - 1933
Central America and Caribbean		
Cuba	USA - Spain	1848 - 1898
Isla de Pinos	USA - Cuba	1909 - 1925
Guantánamo Bay	Cuba - USA	1960 -
Navassa Island	Haiti - USA	1859 - 1914
	Haiti - USA	1935 -
Môle St. Nicholas	USA - Haiti	1889 - 1915
Samaná Bay	USA - Dom. Rep.	1894 - 1904
Virgin Islands	USA - Denmark	1865 - 1917
Río Massacre	Haiti - Dom. Rep.	1894 - 1915
	Haiti - Dom. Rep.	1934 - 1935

Quita Sueño-Roncador-Serrana	Colombia - USA	1890 - 1972
	Nicaragua - USA	1900 - 1928
	Nicaragua - Colombia	1900 - 1928, 1967 -
	Honduras - USA	1899 - 1928
	Honduras - Colombia	1899 - 1928
Serranilla Bank & Bajo Nuevo	Honduras - Colombia	1982 - 1986
San Andrés y Providencia	Nicaragua - Colombia	1900 - 1930
	Nicaragua - Colombia	1979 -
Clipperton Island	France - Mexico	1897 - 1934
Río Hondo	Mexico - UK	1831 - 1897
Chiapas	Guatemala - Mexico	1868 - 1882
Belize	Guatemala - UK	1868 - 1981
	Guatemala - Belize	1981 -
Ranguana & Sapodilla (Zapotillo)	Guatemala - UK	1981 - 1981
	Guatemala - Belize	1981 -
	Honduras - UK	1981 - 1981
	Honduras - Belize	1981 -
	Honduras - Guatemala	1981 -
Mosquito Coast	Colombia - UK	1831 - 1860
	Colombia - Nicaragua	1900 - 1928
Río Motagua	Honduras - Guatemala	1899 - 1933
Cordillera Monte Cristo	Guatemala - El Salvador	1935 - 1938
Bolsones	El Salvador - Honduras	1899 - 1992
Gulf of Fonseca Islands	Honduras - El Salvador	1899 - 1992
& Conejo Island	El Salvador - Honduras	2000 -
Teotecacinte	Nicaragua - Honduras	1900 - 1906
	Nicaragua - Honduras	1912 - 1961
Cayo Sur - Media Luna	Nicaragua - Honduras	1998 -
Swan Islands	Honduras - USA	1921 - 1972
Mangles (Corn) Islands	Colombia - Nicaragua	1906 - 1928
	Nicaragua - USA	1965 - 1971
Nicaragua Canal	USA - Nicaragua	1900 - 1916
Río Sixaola y Río Coto	Costa Rica - Panama	1920 - 1941
Juradó	Panama - Colombia	1920 - 1938
Canal Zone	USA - Colombia	1899 - 1903
	Colombia - USA	1903 - 1922
	Panama - USA	1920 - 1979

South America

Goajirá-Guainía	Venezuela - Colombia	1841 - 1922
Los Monjes	Colombia - Venezuela	1951 -
Oriente-Aguarico	Ecuador - Colombia	1854 - 1919
Loreto	Peru - Colombia	1839 - 1922
& Leticia	Peru - Colombia	1932 - 1935
Apaporis	Brazil - Colombia	1831 - 1928
Aves Island	Venezuela - Netherlands	1854 - 1865

Essequibo	Venezuela - UK	1841 - 1899
	Venezuela - UK	1951 - 1966
	Venezuela - Guyana	1966 -
Patos Island	Venezuela - UK	1859 - 1942
Amazonas	Venezuela - Brazil	1841 - 1928
Los Roques	Netherlands - Venezuela	1850 - 1856
Corentyn/New River Triangle	Netherlands - UK	1816 - 1966
	Netherlands - Guyana	1966 - 1975
	Suriname - Guyana	1975 -
Pirara	Brazil - UK	1838 - 1926
Maroni	Netherlands - France	1849 - 1975
	Suriname - France	1975 -
Tumuc-Humac	Brazil - Netherlands	1852 - 1906
Amapá	Portugal - France	1816 - 1822
	France - Brazil	1826 - 1900
Oriente-Mainas	Ecuador - Peru	1854 - 1945
& Cordillera del Cóndor	Ecuador - Peru	1947 - 1998
Galápagos Islands	USA - Ecuador	1854 - 1855
	USA - Ecuador	1892 - 1906
Amazonas-Caquetá	Ecuador - Brazil	1854 - 1904
& Amazonas-Içá	Brazil - Ecuador	1904 - 1922
Chincha Islands	Spain - Peru	1864 - 1866
Acre	Peru - Brazil	1839 - 1909
	Peru - Bolivia	1848 - 1912
	Brazil - Bolivia	1848 - 1909
Apa	Paraguay - Brazil	1846 - 1874
& Río Paraguay Islands	Paraguay - Brazil	1874 - 1929
Misiones	Argentina - Brazil	1841 - 1895
Yaguarón	Uruguay - Brazil	1882 -
Trindade Island	Brazil - UK	1826 - 1896
Chaco Boreal	Bolivia - Paraguay	1878 - 1939
Antofagasta	Chile - Bolivia	1848 - 1884
& Tacna-Arica	Bolivia - Chile	1884 -
	Chile - Peru	1879 - 1884
	Peru - Chile	1884 - 1929
	Bolivia - Peru	1883 - 1936
Puna de Atacama	Argentina - Bolivia	1841 - 1941
& Los Andes	Chile - Argentina	1896 - 1904
Chaco Central	Argentina - Paraguay	1846 - 1878
Patagonia	Chile - Argentina	1841 - 1903
Beagle Channel	Argentina - Chile	1904 - 1985
Palena/Continental Glaciers	Chile - Argentina	1903 - 1998
Río de La Plata	Argentina - Uruguay	1882 - 1973
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands	Argentina - UK	1841 -

Northern and Western Europe

Northern Ireland	Ireland – UK	1922 - 1999
Treaty Ports	Ireland - UK	1927 - 1938
Ecrehos & Minquiers	France - UK	1886 – 1953
Gibraltar	Spain – UK	1816 -
Limburg & Zeeland Flanders	Netherlands – Belgium	1830 – 1839
	Belgium - Netherlands	1918 – 1920
Baarle Enclaves	Netherlands - Belgium	1922 – 1940
	Netherlands - Belgium	1945 – 1959
Elten & Tudderen	W.Germany - Netherlands	1955 – 1963
Belgium	France - Belgium	1866 - 1867
Neutral Moresnet (Altenberg)	Germany – Belgium	1841 – 1919
Eupen & Malmédy	Belgium - Germany	1917 – 1919
	Germany – Belgium	1919 – 1940
Luxembourg	Netherlands - Belgium	1830 - 1839
	France – Netherlands	1866 – 1867
Vallée des Dappes	France - Switzerland	1816 - 1862
Alsace-Lorraine (Elsass-Lothringen)	Prussia - France	1870 – 1871
	France – Germany	1871 – 1919
Prussian Rheinprovinz	France - Prussia	1849 - 1871
Bavarian Palatinate (Pfalz)	France - Bavaria	1849 - 1871
Rheinhessen	France - Hesse GD	1849 - 1871
Saar (Sarre)	France - Germany	1917 - 1920
	Germany - France	1920 – 1935
	W.Germany - France	1955 – 1957
Jussy	Switzerland - Sardinia	1816 - 1816
Savoy & Nice	France – Italy	1848 – 1860
	Italy - France	1938 - 1943
Upper Savoy (Chablais-Faucigny)	Switzerland - Italy	1859 - 1860
	Switzerland - France	1860 - 1860
Corsica	Italy - France	1938 - 1943
Val d'Aosta-Briga-Tenda	France - Italy	1945 - 1947
Neuchâtel	Switzerland - Prussia	1848 - 1857
Kulmbach-Gersfeld-Orb	Prussia - Bavaria	1866 - 1866
Badenese Corridor	Bavaria - Baden	1816 - 1832
& Germersheim Frontage	Bavaria - Baden	1838 - 1840
	Bavaria - Baden	1870 - 1870
Salzburg	Austria - Bavaria	1816 - 1816
Leipzig-Bautzen	Prussia - Saxony	1866 - 1866
Hohenzollern	Württemberg - Prussia	1870 - 1870
Homburg-Upper Hesse	Prussia - HesseDarmstadt	1866 - 1866
Heligoland	Prussia - UK	1884 - 1890
Schleswig-Holstein	Prussia – Denmark	1864 – 1864
	Prussia – Austria	1864 - 1866
	Denmark - Germany	1919 - 1920
German Reunification	W.Germany – E.Germany	1955 – 1972

West Berlin	USSR - USA	1948 – 1971
	E.Germany – W.Germany	1958 – 1972
Lombardy-Venetia	Italy – Austria-Hungary	1848 – 1866
Papal States	Piedmont - Papal States	1858 - 1860
Modena	Piedmont - Modena	1848 - 1860
Parma	Piedmont - Parma	1848 - 1860
Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol)	Italy – Austria-Hungary	1866 – 1919
Graham Island	Two Sicilies - UK	1831 - 1831
Finnmark / Varangerfjord	Russia - Sweden	1851 - 1855
Spitsbergen (Svalbard)	Russia – Norway	1945 - 1947
Aaland Islands	Sweden – Russia	1854 - 1856
	Sweden – Finland	1918 – 1921
Finland	Sweden - Finland	1854 - 1856
Karelia & Petsamo	Finland – Russia	1917 – 1920
	Russia – Finland	1938 – 1940
	Finland - Russia	1941 - 1944
	Russia - Finland	1944 - 1944
	Finland - Russia	1945 - 1947

Note: claim dates are constrained by membership in the COW international system, limiting these claims to interactions between recognized sovereign states. Claims can not begin until both states qualify for system membership, and claims are considered to end with the loss of system membership.

Table 2: Development, Democracy, and the Origins of Territorial Claims

A. Economic Development and Claims to Any Territory

Development level of state	Does state begin 1+ claim during this year? (1816-1945)			Does state begin 1+ claim during this year? (1946-2001)		
	No	Yes (%)	Total	No	Yes (%)	Total
Developed	412	13 (3.1%)	425	712	7 (1.0%)	719
Less Developed	2945	99 (3.3)	3044	1767	12 (0.7)	1779
Total	3357	112 (3.2)	3469	2479	19 (0.8)	2498

$X^2 = 0.04$ (1 d.f., $p < .83$) $X^2 = 0.61$ (1 d.f., $p < .44$)

B. Economic Development and Claims to Economically Valuable Territory

Development level of state	Does state begin 1+ claim during this year? (1816-1945)			Does state begin 1+ claim during this year? (1946-2001)		
	No	Yes (%)	Total	No	Yes (%)	Total
Developed	421	4 (0.9%)	425	713	6 (0.8%)	719
Less Developed	2998	46 (1.5)	3044	1771	8 (0.5)	1779
Total	3419	50 (1.4)	3469	2484	14 (0.6)	2498

$X^2 = 0.85$ (1 d.f., $p < .36$) $X^2 = 1.36$ (1 d.f., $p < .25$)

C. Political Democracy and Claims to Economically Valuable Territory

Regime type of state	Does state begin 1+ claim during this year? (1816-1945)			Does state begin 1+ claim during this year? (1946-2001)		
	No	Yes (%)	Total	No	Yes (%)	Total
Democracy	843	22 (2.5%)	865	1288	7 (0.5%)	1295
Other	2384	27 (1.1)	2411	804	6 (0.7)	810
Total	3327	49 (1.5)	3276	2092	13 (0.6)	2105

$X^2 = 8.76$ (1 d.f., $p < .01$) $X^2 = 0.33$ (1 d.f., $p < .57$)

Table 3: Economic Development and the Origin of Territorial Claims

A. Claims to Any Territory

Variable	Model 1: 1816-1945 Coeff (S.E.)	Model 2: 1946-2001 Coeff (S.E.)
Constant	- 3.69 (0.15)***	- 4.03 (0.44)***
Economic development (Energy consumption/capita)	- 0.58 (0.16)***	0.06 (0.04)
Democracy	0.90 (0.23)***	- 0.91 (0.54)*
Total population (1000s)	0.03 (0.01)***	.001 (0.01)
Militarization (Military personnel/capita)	0.49 (7.13)	- 86.8 (68.3)
N:	2963	2087
Log Likelihood:	-421.16	-100.65
LR Chi-square:	25.31 (4 d.f.)	5.65 (4 d.f.)
	$p < .001$	$p < .23$

B. Claims to Economically Valuable Territory

Variable	Model 1: 1816-1945 Coeff (S.E.)	Model 2: 1946-2001 Coeff (S.E.)
Constant	- 4.58 (0.23)***	- 4.53 (0.54)***
Economic development (Energy consumption/capita)	- 0.62 (0.24)***	0.07 (0.04)
Democracy	1.17 (0.33)***	- 0.59 (0.63)
Total population (1000s)	0.02 (0.01)*	.004 (0.01)
Militarization (Military personnel/capita)	6.95 (7.59)	- 101.1 (84.5)
N:	2963	2087
Log Likelihood:	-225.04	-76.88
LR Chi-square:	16.08 (4 d.f.)	4.20 (4 d.f.)
	$p < .01$	$p < .38$

$* \ p < .10, ** \ p < .05, *** \ p < .01.$

Table 4: Development, Democracy, and the Militarization of Territorial Claims

A. Economic Development and Claims to Any Territory

	1+ MID over claim this year? (1816-1945)			1+ MID over claim this year? (1946-2001)		
Development of challenger	No	Yes (%)	Total	No	Yes (%)	Total
Developed	341	8 (2.3%)	349	225	10 (4.3%)	235
Less Developed	4237	121 (2.8)	4358	1075	57 (5.0)	1132
Total	4578	129 (2.7)	4707	1300	67 (4.9)	1367

$X^2 = 0.28$ (1 d.f., $p < .60$) $X^2 = 0.25$ (1 d.f., $p < .62$)

B. Economic Development and Claims to Economically Valuable Territory

	1+ MID over claim this year? (1816-1945)			1+ MID over claim this year? (1946-2001)		
Development of challenger	No	Yes (%)	Total	No	Yes (%)	Total
Developed	169	3 (1.7%)	172	151	7 (4.4%)	158
Less Developed	1904	78 (3.9)	1982	390	18 (4.4)	408
Total	2073	81 (3.8)	2154	541	25 (4.4)	566

$X^2 = 2.10$ (1 d.f., $p < .15$) $X^2 = 0.0001$ (1 d.f., $p < .99$)

C. Political Democracy and Claims to Economically Valuable Territory

	1+ MID over claim this year? (1816-1945)			1+ MID over claim this year? (1946-2001)		
Regime type of challenger	No	Yes (%)	Total	No	Yes (%)	Total
Democracy	561	9 (1.6%)	570	303	17 (5.3%)	320
Other	1512	72 (4.6)	1584	238	8 (3.3)	246
Total	2073	81 (3.8)	2154	541	25 (4.4)	566

$X^2 = 10.19$ (1 d.f., $p < .001$) $X^2 = 1.40$ (1 d.f., $p < .24$)

Table 5: Economic Development and the Militarization of Territorial Claims

Variable	Model 1: 1816-1945 Coeff (S.E.)	Model 2: 1946-2001 Coeff (S.E.)
Constant	- 4.62 (0.60)***	- 4.04 (0.99)***
Economic development (Energy consumption/capita)	- 0.16 (0.20)	- 0.02 (0.07)
Democracy	- 0.57 (0.60)	- 0.24 (0.40)
Relative capabilities: Rough parity ($\leq$3:1) Challenger stronger	0.75 (0.29)*** 0.50 (0.36)	1.46 (0.51)*** 1.07 (0.59)*
Salience of claimed territory	0.21 (0.06)***	0.13 (0.10)
Peace years	- 0.29 (0.06)***	- 0.24 (0.09)***
Spline(1)	- .002 (.001)***	- .001 (.001)*
Spline(2)	.001 (.0002)**	- .0007 (.0004)
Spline(3)	- .00001 (.00004)	- .00006 (.00006)
N:	4668	1358
Log Likelihood:	-494.42	-213.43
LR Chi-square:	84.35 (9 d.f.) p < .001	33.43 (9 d.f.) p < .001

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.