Domestic Politics and Interstate Rivalry

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Abstract: Most large-*N* research on recurrent conflict and rivalry has downplayed the role of domestic politics, either overlooking the domestic political context within states entirely or mentioning domestic politics only implicitly. This paper focuses explicitly on the domestic political actors and processes that may be relevant to processes of conflict recurrence, in order to develop a more domestically-grounded model of recurrent conflict and rivalry. Putnam's two-level game framework and Hagan's research on political oppositions are used to develop a general model of how domestic political actors contribute to the evolution of rivalry, and to reformulate past hypotheses on rivalry. The resulting model and hypotheses are examined through a plausibility probe using the example of the rivalry between Bolivia and Paraguay.

Most large-*N* empirical research on recurrent conflict or rivalry has minimized or ignored the possible impact of domestic political factors in the outbreak, evolution, or ending of rivalries. As Mor (1997: 198) notes, most research on rivalries has followed a state-as-unitary-actor assumption, leaving no room for domestic factors. Where domestic factors have been considered in relation to rivalries, these factors have typically been treated only implicitly, and have been assigned a secondary role behind the international influences of the rivalry itself.

The present paper reformulates the study of rivalry by considering the impact of domestic political pressures and constraints on foreign policy making. I develop a general two-level model of rivalry that considers the role of states' political leadership, non-executive governmental actors, public opinion, and politically active opinion leaders. This discussion of domestic politics is used to reformulate past hypotheses on rivalry, as well as to generate additional hypotheses not considered explicitly in past research. Although the resulting hypotheses are not tested directly in this paper, they are consistent with the results of a plausibility probe using the Bolivia-Paraguay rivalry.

Adding Domestic Politics to Recurrent Conflict and Rivalry

Moravcsik (1993: 9) argues that "the question facing international relations theorists today is not *whether* to combine domestic and international explanations into a theory of 'double-edged' diplomacy, but *how* best to do so." The first section of this paper proposes a way to study interstate rivalry through both domestic and international lenses. This examination begins with Putnam's (1988) notion of the two-level game, which is then extended by identifying specific types of domestic actors and processes that might be involved in making foreign policy.

It should be noted that these domestic political factors are very general and are expected to apply in any type of political system, whether democratic or authoritarian, parliamentary or presidential. As Hagan (1993) suggests, both democratic and authoritarian governments face important domestic political constraints; it is misleading to argue that all democratic ("open") systems offer equal constraints or that all authoritarian ("closed") systems are free from constraints. Putnam (1988: 436-437) emphasizes that the domestic portion of his model is meant to apply for both democratic and authoritarian states. Similarly, the arguments of Bueno de Mesquita, et al., (1992, 1995, 1997) are applied to democracies, monarchies, or autocracies, all of which are characterized by some type of domestic constituency that must be addressed. Thus, while there may be some differences in the effects of public opinion between democratic and monarchic systems (for example), for now these systems are treated together -- although future work

is certainly encouraged to address these differences in greater detail.

It must also be noted that this paper is not directly concerned with the impact of two rivals' domestic political structures, as covered in the voluminous literature on the democratic peace proposition. Bennett (1997), Hensel (1995), and Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl (1998), among others, have already addressed the relationship between joint democracy and the evolution or termination of rivalry. The present paper focuses on arguments about specific types of domestic political actors, which (as noted by Hagan [1993]) may be present in any type of political system.

Two-Level Games

An important way to frame the connection between domestic and international politics involves Putnam's (1988; see also Moravcsik 1993) notion of the "two-level game." Putnam characterizes international negotiation as a game involving both national and international levels. The national level involves a game between political leaders and various domestic actors, while the international level involves a game between two state leaders. Because the two state leaders in the international game are playing both the international and national games simultaneously, they face both opportunities and constraints that they would not encounter in a strictly national game or a strictly international game. Essentially, this two-level game simplifies to a game of bargaining between the negotiators (state leaders, or what Moravcsik calls "chiefs of government") and separate games of ratification within each state after a bargain is reached.[1]

To be successful at the two-level game, the involved leaders must be able to reach an agreement that each considers acceptable and that both sides' domestic constituencies are willing to ratify. Leaders in such a game are thus constrained simultaneously by the domestic and international implications of their actions, and must choose policies based on their expectations of both what the other player will accept and what their (and their opponents') constituents will be willing to ratify (Moravcsik 1993). The constraints and opportunities of this "double-edged diplomacy" (Evans, et al. 1993) differ dramatically from those under a strictly international emphasis on pursuing the "national interest" in an anarchic world or a strictly domestic emphasis on satisfying one's constituents.

Putnam's two-level game metaphor offers a useful framework with which to analyze rivalry, which can be seen as involving two states each pursuing their own goals while dealing with domestic constraints. Much remains to be specified, though, before this metaphor can produce meaningful hypotheses about interstate rivalry. The next sections of this paper address central elements of the two-level game as applied to rivalry: the international game, the domestic game, and the interrelationships between the two games. Once the elements of the two-level game have been specified, the resulting model is used to reformulate existing hypotheses on rivalry.

A General Theoretical Model of Interstate Conflict and Rivalry

1 It is important to note that "ratification" in this sense does not necessarily imply a democratic political system in which a legislature is required to ratify all treaties. Ratification could involve any formal or informal process at the domestic level that has the effect of endorsing, implementing, or rejecting an actual or potential agreement from the international-level game. Also, as Moravcsik (1993) points out, the term "ratification" may also misleadingly imply that the international game is resolved before the domestic game begins. Rather, the international and domestic games "are intertwined and simultaneous, as expectations and unfolding developments in one arena affect negotiations in the other arena."

Interstate rivalry refers to a longstanding, competitive relationship between two adversaries who engage in numerous militarized confrontations (Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1993; Hensel 1996a). Although there have been relatively few rivalries in the modern era,[2] Hensel (1998b) notes that enduring rival adversaries account for one-fourth of all interstate wars and territorial changes (as measured by the Correlates of War project), roughly forty percent of all militarized interstate disputes and violent territorial changes, and approximately half of all international crises (as recorded by the ICB data set). Rivalry has also been argued to be an important theoretical element of such explanations for war as general deterrence, arms races, and power transitions (Hensel 1996a, 1998b).

Most research employing Putnam's notion of the two-level game (e.g., the case studies in Evans, et al., 1993) has focused on peaceful negotiations, with little attention to the militarized dimensions of world politics. Yet there appears to be no reason that this notion could not be applied to militarized relationships such as rivalry. Instead of negotiations over international trade or monetary stabilization policies, a two-level game of rivalry would involve attempts to settle the contentious issue(s) between two potential adversaries. In a rivalry over territory, for example, the leaders of the two rival states could be negotiating over the status of the disputed territory, attempting to reach a peaceful settlement that would be acceptable to both of their constituencies.[3]

The next section of this paper examines one particular model of rivalry, developed in my own research on the evolution of rivalry and on the management of contentious issues. The basic model (Hensel 1996a, 1998a) traces the origins of militarized interstate conflict and rivalry to the existence of conflicts of interest between two or more adversaries over contentious issue(s). Numerous policy options are available to two (or more) states' foreign policy makers for attempting to resolve their contentious issues, including maintaining the status quo, taking unilateral action up to and including the threat or use of militarized force, pursuing bilateral negotiations, or employing third party assistance such as mediation or adjudication. The initiation of overt militarized conflict can thus be seen as a conscious decision by leaders on at least one side, representing the feeling that unilateral military action is the best way to achieve their state's goals with regard to the issue(s) under contention.

Policy makers in this model are assumed to be driven by two primary goals, achieving their desired position regarding the issue(s) under contention and remaining in political power (Hensel 1998a). In order to reach these goals, policy makers are assumed to consider two important guidelines to help choose among the policy options listed above. The first consideration is that they wish to maximize the probability of achieving most or all of their goals with regard to the issue(s) under contention. A second consideration is that they wish to minimize the (military, economic, political, or social) costs incurred while pursuing these goals. If they can accomplish most of their goals successfully and at a relatively low cost, then they are more likely to be able to retain political power. Alternatively, if they fail to accomplish their goals (or, indeed, end up worsening the situation) or if their decisions lead to high costs for their

[2] Different operationalizations of rivalry generate lists of rivalries ranging from 34 to 103 rivalries (Bennett 1996; Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl 1998; Hensel 1998a). The differences result primarily from different minimum rivalry duration requirements, minimum levels of hostility for militarized disputes, and spatial-temporal domains. Despite these differences, the different rivalry data sets generally produce very similar results.

3 The same logic would apply for non-territorial issues. For example, two leaders could negotiate over questions of regional or global influence, the treatment of ethnic or religious minorities, or the usage of a common resource along their border. In each case, the goal of the game would be to reach an international agreement that could be approved within both states.

state or their constituents, then they are likely to pay a heavy price in domestic political support and in their prospects for remaining in power (see also Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Fearon 1994).[4]

Many factors can be described as influencing policy makers' decisions regarding the selection of an appropriate option (Hensel 1996a, 1998a). Because the model begins with contention over issues, a logical influence on policy making is the nature of the issues under contention, with more salient issues such as territory being more likely to lead to militarized action than other issues that are seen as less important. A positive balance of relative capabilities may make the prospects for successful military action more favorable, increasing a state's willingness to use militarized means in pursuit of goals, while a state that is weaker than its adversary may have important incentives to pursue a peaceful settlement and avoid military action if at all possible. Two adversaries that are both political democracies may be more likely to pursue peaceful means of settlement with each other, recognizing that the costs of settlement are lower than military action and expecting that both sides will respect the process and outcome of a negotiated or third-party settlement (thereby increasing the prospects for a successful settlement as well). Past interactions between two adversaries are likely to affect their future expectations, as when a history of frequent militarized conflict between them or a history of unsuccessful peaceful settlement attempts leads to the expectation of future conflict and the perception that peaceful means of settlement are unlikely to succeed in settling the issues at stake. Additionally, the outcome of a previous confrontation between the adversaries may change the status quo regarding the disputed issues, such as by leading to a violent transfer of disputed territory or by raising additional issues that had not been disputed previously.

Previous applications of this basic model (Hensel 1996a, 1998a) have been framed in terms of general dyadic relations between two adversaries, with little attention to the potential role of domestic politics. The focus of the present paper is on the influence of domestic factors on militarized interstate conflict and rivalry, both directly and indirectly through these other factors that have been addressed in earlier research. The next section begins to reconceptualize this general model from both domestic and international perspectives, drawing from Putnam's (1988) two-level game metaphor and from research on domestic politics and foreign policy.

The International Game: Negotiating over Issues

As noted earlier, the current literature on interstate rivalry has focused almost exclusively on international processes and influences, which essentially forms the international level of Putnam's two-level game. The international level features interaction between the chief executives of two adversary nation-states (or their representatives), each of which is pursuing his or her own goals in negotiating with the other over one or more contentious issues. Unlike the traditional approach to rivalry, though, the two-level game metaphor rejects the standard states-as-unitary-actors assumption and explicitly considers the

4 It should be noted that this model excludes a leader's performance in the domestic arena, although it is clear that domestic economic and social phenomena contribute significantly to the prospects for retention in power. Because this is a model of foreign policy, rather than a model of domestic economics or political elections, the focus here is on the contribution of foreign policy-related calculations to political power. None the less, no claim is made that domestic policies are unimportant, or even that domestic policy is less important than foreign policy.

influence of domestic actors within each state.[5] Thus, while state leaders continue to pursue their conception of the national (or their personal) interest, they are also constrained by the forces of domestic politics. The chief executive is the only player to be involved in both levels of the two-level game, both negotiating with the opponent's chief executive and attempting to obtain domestic approval for any deal that may be reached internationally.

Chief executives in the international level of the rivalry game are assumed to have relatively straightforward preferences. As suggested in the basic model presented earlier, one primary goal of leaders is to achieve their desired position regarding the issue(s) under contention; the other primary goal, remaining in political power, is only relevant in the domestic-level game. In order to achieve this goal, leaders in the international game are assumed to consider two important guidelines: maximizing the probability of achieving most or all of their issue-related goals with regard to the issue(s) under contention, and minimizing the (military, economic, political, or social) costs incurred while pursuing these goals. The challenge facing leaders in the international game is to accomplish most of their goals successfully and at a relatively low cost; failing to accomplish these goals, worsening the situation, or paying high costs for their state or their constituents are considered failures in this game. As will be seen shortly, adding the domestic portion of the two-level game introduces additional challenges to leaders in the form of domestic constraints.

In terms used by Putnam (1988) and Moravcsik (1993), the chief executive's goals establish his or her "acceptability set." This set includes all possible agreements or settlements that the leader prefers to the status quo, and would thus be willing to sign. Presumably, an international agreement is easier to reach when one or both sides' chief executives have large acceptability sets, meaning that they would be willing to agree to a wider range of possible settlements that would each be preferable to the status quo. In the two-level game, though, additional factors must be considered because of the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy decisions and outcomes within each country; the domestic portion of the two-level game is the next topic for consideration.

The Domestic Game: Ratification and Selection

Adding domestic politics to the study of rivalry requires specification of the types of influence that domestic politics might be expected to have on international politics. Putnam (1988) treats the domestic portion of two-level games as essentially a ratification game, where the domestic actors must decide whether or not to ratify an international agreement that is signed by their leader.[6] Hagan (1993) expands the role of domestic actors in foreign policy making by suggests that leaders must deal with two distinct

[5] Although the unitary actor assumption is rejected, the negotiator in the international and domestic level is assumed to be a unitary actor. Regardless of the specific structures of its political system, any modern nation-state can reasonably be assumed to have a leader (a president, king, dictator, or other chief executive) who is officially responsible for making foreign policy decisions. As Bueno de Mesquita (1981: 20-23) argues, even if many other domestic actors and structures may influence a leader's decision for war or peace, the final decision remains that of the leader. Regardless of the views of other actors in government or in society, the approval of the chief executive remains necessary for starting a war, and the executive's disapproval can be considered sufficient to prevent war. Future research is encouraged to extend this model by considering the impact of divisions with the executive branch of government, adding further detail and complexity (but likely greater accuracy) to the model.

[6] It should be noted that this ratification role does not mean than domestic politics only becomes relevant once an agreement is signed. Leaders' decisions on whether or not to sign agreements, or on the specific provisions of agreements, may be influenced by their leaders' perception of the likelihood of eventual ratification.

domestic political constraints: the need to build policy coalitions (similar to Putnam's ratification function) and the goal of retaining political power.[7]

The goal of building policy coalitions -- or pursuing domestic ratification -- requires that the chief executive achieve agreement among at least a subset of the domestic actors with some authority over resource commitment or policy implementation. Unless a large enough coalition of supporters can be assembled, no agreement signed by a leader can be ratified or implemented, rendering the agreement meaningless (and likely creating new problems for the leader in subsequent international negotiations). Hagan (1993) notes that coalition building occurs in most types of political systems, ranging from established Western democracies to strict authoritarian regimes.

The goal of retaining political power recognizes that leaders generally prefer to remain in power. While a chief executive is concerned with pursuing personal and/or state interests in the international game, he or she also seeks to maintain and enhance the electoral or other bases necessary for staying in office. As a result, when domestic political pressures threaten to shorten a leader's tenure in office, he or she is likely to consider adjusting policies in order to reduce domestic opposition (Hagan 1993). Confrontation with a foreign adversary is likely to be an especially important source of public evaluations of a leader's performance (Hagan 1993), with an overly aggressive foreign policy indicating a willingness to risk war and an overly accommodative foreign policy indicating a leader's weakness.

These domestic constraints fit well with the international portion of the two-level game discussed above, allowing for both domestic and international influences on a leader's choices and actions. Each chief executive in the game will continue to pursue a settlement of the disputed issues that favors his or her state's position, as noted earlier, but now the leader must also keep in mind what type of agreement will be acceptable to the domestic actors responsible for ratification. As a result, the leader may find it necessary to build domestic support for his or her preferred policies, in order to accomplish the desired goals as well as to remain in office. From this perspective, it becomes clear why leaders must generally attempt to reduce the military, economic, and social costs of their policies, because an overly aggressive or costly policy -- while perhaps increasing the likelihood of a successful resolution of the disputed issue -- may lead to sufficient domestic wrath that the leader's policy is rejected or the leader is actually removed from office.

A vital part of specifying the nature of domestic politics involves identifying the types of actors involved in the domestic political game. Beyond the chief executive (who is involved in both the domestic and international levels of the game), I distinguish three primary types of domestic actors: non-executive actors within government, politically active (non-governmental) actors within society, and the mass public.[8] The next section of this paper examines each actor type, drawing from past research on domestic politics and foreign policy to specify the roles that each is likely to play in rivalry.

Non-Executive Governmental Actors

Although the chief executive is the primary maker of foreign policy decisions, most political

[7] Trumbore (1998) notes that the power to remove a leader electorally (or, presumably, through other means) essentially gives the public indirect power to ratify agreements, even if the public does not explicitly vote up or down on an agreement.

8 Hagan (1993) adds the possibility of divisions within the political leadership that might stem from personality, factional, or bureaucratic differences. For the purposes of the present paper, though, the chief executive is treated as a unitary actor, in order to avoid complicating the model unnecessarily beyond the four types of domestic actors that are already included.

systems offer at least a nominal role for other governmental actors. In the United States, for example, certain foreign policy decisions – typically those involving the expenditure of money, declaration of war, extended deployment of troops abroad, or ratification of treaties – require the concurrence of Congress. This concurrence role is different from the executive's ability to negotiate treaties or to order the initial deployment of troops, so the legislature (or other non-executive actors) does not actually participate in the selection of foreign policy alternatives. Because the ratification process can lead to the rejection of a treaty or reversal of a policy chosen by the executive, though, the requirement of ratification should allow the legislature to limit the actions that the executive is likely to take because of the danger of policy reversal (Milbrath 1967).

Non-executive governmental actors such as the legislature are thus the primary actors involved in the policy coalition-building constraint described by Hagan, as well as the ratification process described by Putnam (1988). With regard to rivalry, non-executive actors in most governments must agree to such vital foreign policy initiatives as the defense budget or any treaty that attempts to settle any disputed issues with the rival. In effect, then, a pacifist legislature could undercut a rivalry by refusing to pass a costly or provocative defense spending bill, and a belligerent legislature could prolong a rivalry by rejecting any treaty the leader may sign with the rival to settle their issues.

The Mass Public

An important domestic actor that can have a profound influence on leaders' choices regarding recurrent conflict and rivalry is the mass public, which is generally responsible for the leader's continuation in power. In democratic systems, the role of the mass public is clear, because the chief executive must stand for regular elections in which the public can reelect or replace the leader (or, if terms are limited, his or her preferred successor). Even in authoritarian systems, the mass public can play an important role in the selection of leaders, whether directly (through protests, riots, or open revolution) or indirectly (by encouraging elements in the military or government to overthrow the government).

The mass public can be seen as having an important influence on policy making, because a chief executive may be reluctant to jeopardize his or her chances of remaining in power by persisting in unpopular policies. Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (1992) argue that governments are likely to be held accountable by their constituents for the success or failure of their foreign policies. As a result, leaders must be concerned with the domestic consequences of foreign policy decisions, which should dampen leaders' enthusiasm for risky foreign adventures (with their potential for costly defeat). Similarly, Fearon (1994) suggests that – at least for political democracies – a leader's statements and actions during a crisis will be used by his or her constituents to evaluate the skill and performance of the leader.[9] A leader who escalates a crisis before backing down should thus be likely to encounter serious domestic political problems afterward, because his or her actions cost the state dearly in terms of credibility, face, or honor. Consistent with these expectations, Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (1992) find that failure in full-scale war – whether due to defeat, high costs, or both – greatly increases the probability of the leader's removal from office.

In addition to the mass public's role in the selection of leaders, the public can attempt to influence

[9] Mor (1997) raises a similar point with regard to audience costs and peace initiatives within ongoing rivalries. A public peace initiative in the presence of high audience costs may be a strong signal of a commitment to peace, because it raises the domestic political exit costs for the leader in case the initiative fails.

the decisions of non-executive actors in government. The mass public is occasionally (albeit rarely) given a direct say in policy making or ratification through a plebiscite, as with the plebiscite in Tacna and Arica over the question of Peruvian or Chilean ownership and the recent plebiscites in Europe over the European Union. More indirectly, other actors besides the chief executive are concerned with public opinion, such as when the legislature is elected by and responsible to the people. Those actors responsible for policy ratification, then, may be influenced by public opinion over contentious foreign policy issues (although the evidence on this linkage is quite mixed; see Powlick and Katz [1998]).

Research on the mass public and foreign policy making suggests that most average citizens do not pay great attention to problems of foreign policy on a regular basis.[10] Rosenau (1980: 475) suggests that an ordinary citizen tends to see foreign policy as dealing with "remote and obscure matters that, if they are kept under control, seem too distant from the daily needs and wants of most citizens to arouse concern." Similarly, Powlick and Katz (1998: 31-33) characterize public attitudes toward most foreign policy issues as disengaged or uninformed, and "more latent than real." Opinions are thought to be aroused "only be events that seem to impinge on one's interests, activities, or aspirations," and as long as the external environment does not change too rapidly, it is unlikely to appear linked to the welfare of average citizens in potentially damaging ways (Rosenau 1980: 475, 480; Powlick and Katz 1998). Public opinion on foreign policy issues thus usually lies dormant, with foreign affairs left to the management of political leaders.

When the mass public becomes activated on foreign policy issues, though, Rosenau (1980: 474-475) suggests that it is likely to display relatively simple but intense opinions (in comparison to public opinions on domestic issues). Foreign policy issues are suggested to appear threatening to the entire domestic political system, and are thought to generate an "us-versus-them" mentality. Such issues are expected to lead to bipartisan agreement within the domestic environment, in order to provide the greater solidarity that is thought to be necessary for dealing with a foreign threat. Additionally, once the public becomes activated over foreign policy issues, it is likely to press for quick resolution of the problem – indeed, likely becoming anxious to move quicker and further toward resolution than their generally cautious leaders (Rosenau 1980: 486).

McGinnis and Williams (1993) note that -- at least once the mass public has been activated by a rivalry -- much of the domestic political debate within two rival states tends to focus on the external rival. In such an atmosphere, certain domestic actors may also be able to take political advantage of the rivalry. McGinnis and Williams (1993: 2-3) suggest that those political actors "who are best able to defend their policy proposals in terms of suspicions of the rival's behavior" are more likely to prevail in policy debates than they would have been without the rivalry, because of the domestic consensus on the threat posed by the rival. Similarly, actors favoring cooperation or a less belligerent attitude toward the rival may be accused of being enemy sympathizers.

Politically Active Societal Actors (Opinion Leaders)

Public opinion rarely becomes activated – and thus rarely becomes a factor in foreign policy

10 A general lack of attention to foreign policy issues should not be confused with randomness or irrationality. As Holsti (1996) points out, public opinion is generally consistent over time and tends to change predictably in response to changing events and conditions.

making – without contentious public debate among the foreign policy elite (Powlick and Katz 1998). This elite includes the executive branch of government, the legislative branch, leaders of organized interest groups, and commentators and experts from the media or academia. Such elite actors are often much more politically active than the average citizen with regard to foreign policy, following external events much more closely and possessing much stronger opinions about these events than the average citizen. An absence of public debate by members of this elite will tend to perpetuate the public disinterest in foreign policy, and public consensus among opinion leaders will tend to generate public support. Public debate within this elite, though, is likely to lead to public support for each side in the debate, including the side(s) opposing the primary policy makers.

One politically active group of actors is the political opposition. Organized political parties and disorganized individuals who oppose the current political leadership are likely to express their disapproval of government policies, including those related to the management of an ongoing rivalry. United States politicians during the Cold War made frequent use of this tactic to attempt to reduce the popularity of their opponents and to increase their own popularity, perhaps most visibly with John F. Kennedy's use of the alleged "missile gap" with the Soviet Union to call into question Republican leadership in his 1960 presidential campaign. Although opposition parties are likely to be prominent and vocal in their criticism of a current leader, though, it is not clear how much influence they are likely to have on the mass public as a general rule. Public opinion research suggests that elected officials and interest groups (including opposition political parties) are typically seen as politically biased, and thus not very credible sources of information (Powlick and Katz 1998). Furthermore, as Morgan and Bickers (1992) note, the political opposition did not play a role in electing a current leader, so their criticism is unlikely to carry much weight as an influence on government policy.

Special interest groups share the same problem of political opposition, in that both are likely to be seen as politically biased. An additional problem of studying the role of interest groups is that most political issues are likely to feature multiple interest groups with competing opinions, which will attempt to influence both the mass public and the political leadership in opposite directions. None the less, several important generalizations have been made about the role of interest groups with regard to foreign policy and interstate rivalry. First, the so-called "military-industrial complex" ranks among the more influential interest groups, with its powerful lobby for increased defense spending and its need for a perceived foreign threat to justify the expense (Nincic 1989; McGinnis and Williams 1993). Additionally, interest groups favoring noneconomic foreign policy issues like peace and disarmament tend to be marginalized, with very little influence over actual foreign policy decision making (Milbrath 1967). While interest groups may exist on both sides of the spectrum with regard to rivalry, advocating both the intensification and the termination of the rivalry, it may be suggested that the pro-intensification groups are likely to have greater influence over the public and over policy makers than their opponents. This influence may be limited by the general apathy of the public toward foreign policy issues and by the generally small role of interest groups in forming public opinion, but to the extent that interest groups may be said to have a generalizable role with regard to rivalry, it appears that the pro-rivalry groups are likely to hold more influence.

The mass media are generally viewed as more credible and unbiased sources of information than are interest groups or political parties (Powlick and Katz 1998). Even the media, though, are unlikely to be dominant sources of attitude change or policy change among either the mass public or policy makers.

Wolfsfeld (1997), for example, suggests that the political process is more likely to influence the media than the media are to influence the political process, and that the role of the media may be limited by the extent of authorities' control over the political environment (and over access to information). Mueller (1994: 129-134) also suggests that the media may play little independent role in foreign policy making, perhaps reflecting the already-existing interests of their customers (the public) and the events they report. Although certain issues reported heavily by the media appear to generate a large degree of public attention, many other (perhaps most) issues covered by the media fail to do so, calling into question the systematic power of the media to set the foreign policy agenda.

Finally, to the extent that the media may play an important role in foreign policy making, the effects of the media may vary substantially. Livingston (1997) distinguishes between three different types of "CNN effects" on policy making: accelerating the decision making process, impeding governmental options, and agenda-setting with regard to priorities among the mass public. Livingston further suggests that the particular effect(s) of the media in a given situation may depend on the type of issue being addressed, with variation in the extent of media interest, public interest and attentiveness, government media restrictions, and media effectiveness. In short, it may be difficult to produce meaningful generalizations about media influence in foreign policy making, besides noting that the mass media should be included in the list of politically active societal actors that may be able to affect the domestic portion of the two-level rivalry game.

Relationships between the International and Domestic Games

Having identified the central actors involved in the international and domestic games, we must now consider the relationships between these actors. One of the most important contributions of the two-level game is the recognition that a policy maker must play both games simultaneously. As a result, the domestic game constrains decisions by the chief executive in the international game, and the leader may also attempt to manipulate players and processes in the domestic game.

Domestic Constraints on International Bargaining

One important implication of the two-level game metaphor is that each negotiator in the international game is constrained by the size of the "win set" for his or her domestic-level constituency, defined as the set of all possible international-level agreements that could be ratified at the domestic level (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1993). A chief executive is unlikely to sign an international agreement outside of his or her domestic win set, because of the low probability that such an agreement would be ratified by the relevant domestic actors. International agreement only becomes possible when the two sides' win sets overlap, suggesting that the larger these win sets, the greater the likelihood that an agreement can be reached. Depending on the size of two adversaries' win sets, this could be a major constraint on the leaders' actions, essentially preventing any agreement from being reached.

Powlick and Katz (1998) note that policy makers generally consider the "national interest" to be the primary source of policy decisions, although public opinion does tend to enter into the equation. Public opinion generally serves as a "first cut" in the policy making process, with leaders choosing to avoid policies that they expect to generate widespread public opposition. If activation of public opinion is impossible to avoid, then leaders will attempt to manipulate public opinion in their favor, although this is not an easy task.

Despite the limitations imposed by the domestic win set, though, the domestic game can not determine the exact content of any international agreement that might be reached. Any agreement that falls within the domestic win set is considered likely to be ratified domestically, meaning that the leader may sign any agreement that falls somewhere within the win set. A leader may still manipulate the specific agreement toward some personally preferred outcome in his or her personal "acceptance set," as long as the outcome in question lies within the domestic win set (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1993). As a result, effective win sets are likely to be smaller than the set of all outcomes that could be ratified domestically, because not all agreements that the constituency would be willing to ratify will meet with the approval of the leader. Furthermore, if the domestic win set does not include any possible agreement that the leader would find acceptable, the leader is under no obligation to sign an agreement that diverges from his or her personal goals or interests. The leader's exclusive power to negotiate internationally and to submit agreements for ratification offers an ability to veto any agreement that is desired by constituents, by refusing to negotiate seriously or to submit an agreement for ratification (Moravcsik 1993).

It should also be noted that the domestic win set can be a source of bargaining power, as well as a constraint on the chief executive's ability to reach agreements. Putnam (1988) uses the domestic game to introduce the problem of "involuntary defection," which occurs when an agreement that is reached in the international game is rejected by at least one side's domestic constituency. The need for both sides' domestic actors to ratify any international agreement means that the simple fact of two leaders' signature of a treaty may not guarantee cooperation. This problem of involuntary defection suggests that the existence of internal divisions (with a correspondingly small win set) can actually strengthen a negotiator's bargaining position, because the negotiator can make clear to his or her foreign counterpart that his or her hands are tied domestically and only a very favorable agreement will be ratified by his or her domestic constituency. The bargaining benefits of a small win set require that both sides seriously desire an agreement, though, because an intransigent opponent may prefer no agreement to an agreement that favors its rival because of a small win set.

The general dormancy of the mass public on most foreign policy issues might be seen as advantageous to policy makers; Rosenau (1980) argues that foreign policy makers are ordinarily free from the restraints that a politically active citizenry generally imposes in the domestic area. Yet public opinion need not be activated to influence leaders' decisions or policies. As Powlick and Katz (1998: 33) note, even latent opinion might be activated at a later time, and leaders are likely to anticipate (and avoid) decisions that might activate public opposition. Additionally, once public opinion is activated, it may be expected to exert a great deal of influence on leaders' decisions in the international game.

Mor (1997) notes that rivalries can create serious domestic impediments to a peaceful settlement of the issues involved in the rivalry. Continuing the rivalry rather than acquiescing to the rival's demands requires increased defense spending and the occasional mass mobilization of human and material resources for potential or actual use against the rival. The continual societal costs of such activities require the leader to attempt to mobilize support for his or her foreign policy, which (as McGinnis and Williams note) is best accomplished by demonizing the enemy and creating a societal "enemy image" or "inherent bad faith" image of the rival.[11] As a result of both this mobilization and the history of confrontations making up a rivalry, Mor (1997) suggests that the rivalry becomes ingrained in domestic politics, shaping domestic

[11] Mor (1997) also notes that these human and resource demands may eventually become too great for the society to bear, at which point they offer an incentive to end a rivalry instead of prolonging it.

perceptions of the rival in a way that obstructs any attempt to settle the rivalry peacefully. A protracted period of rivalry is thus likely to create a convergence of preferences among domestic actors that supports continuation of the rivalry and that opposes peace initiatives requiring cooperation with the rival; indeed, such a convergence of preferences may be necessary for rivalry to be sustained.

Such images have the unintended effect of complicating later conciliatory moves or peace initiatives should the leader (or a later successor) decide to attempt a peaceful settlement of the rivalry. As Mor (1997: 202) notes, even if leaders come to prefer a negotiated settlement to the continuation of militarized rivalry, "their hands are tied by the legacy of the past." A leader seeking to end a rivalry when public opinion favors continuing it must attempt to manipulate public opinion, whether to the extent that public opinion comes to support rivalry termination or -- at a minimum -- public opinion becomes deadlocked between forces favoring and opposing rivalry termination (Mor 1997).

Another way that rivalry can produce a self-fulfilling dynamic involves the selection of governmental leaders. A leader who is opposed to continuing the rivalry is unlikely to come to power in the first place because of the strong societal preferences that typically accompany rivalries. Similarly, a leader who makes accommodative moves while in office would appear unlikely to retain power for long (whether due to elections, a coup, or some other reselection mechanism). Thus, the domestic political process in a two-level rivalry game suggests that leaders are rewarded for maintaining the status quo of rivalry, and that attempts to deviate in an accommodative direction are likely to be punished (Mor 1997).

One caveat on the role of the mass public is that public opinion only matters in a two-level game when there is a divergence between the preferences of the leader and those of the public (Mor 1997; Trumbore 1998). If the public agrees with the leader on an issue being negotiated, then the public will not impose any constraints on the leader. To the extent that public opinion diverges from the preferences of the leader, though, public opinion can be seen as limiting the options available to the leader. Essentially, public opinion establishes the outer limits of an acceptable agreement that the leader can reach in the international game, essentially setting constraints on the way that leaders can pursue their own goals rather than determining new goals or policy alternatives (see also Hagan 1993). Any leader that defies public opinion by reaching an agreement beyond these limits is likely to encounter difficulties in ratifying or implementing the agreement, and may encounter difficulty in attempting to maintain political power.

Executive Manipulation of Domestic Constraints

Although the domestic win set acts as a constraint on the actions available to a chief executive, the leader may attempt to manipulate this win set in order to overcome or minimize these constraints. For example, a leader may attempt to achieve ratification by altering the domestic win set through side payments, enforcement of party discipline, selective mobilization of political groups, manipulation of information about the agreement, or through a broad program of social or institutional reform (Moravcsik 1993: 25). Indeed, Stein (1993) suggests that even the requirement of formal ratification of any agreement is unlikely to constrain the negotiation behavior of strongly autonomous leaders, who are likely to believe that they can manipulate domestic coalitions and procedures in order to achieve ratification.

The general indifference of the mass public on foreign policy matters can complicate executive attempts to manipulate the domestic political arena. Leaders attempting to mobilize domestic support for foreign policy initiatives are often confronted with "a herculean consensus-building task" (Rosenau 1980: 483-484). In order to attract domestic support, a leader must be able to convince the generally

disinterested public that its welfare is linked to events in the external environment. Indeed, public opinion research indicates that elected officials have very little persuasive effect on the mass public. Even "popular" presidents have a very limited impact on public opinion, while less popular leaders and interest groups have little or no systematic impact. Only prominent media members and "experts" appear to have a meaningful ability to activate the mass public over foreign policy issues (Powlick and Katz 1998).

Hagan (1993) identifies three general types of strategies that leaders in any type of political system may pursue to deal with domestic constituencies in policy making: accommodation, mobilization, and insulation. Accommodation involves bargaining with domestic actors to build a coalition of supporters to ensure ratification and implementation of the policy, and may lead to a compromise solution that is somewhat different from the original policy preferences of the chief executive. Mobilization involves an attempt to convince the constituency to accept the leader's policy preferences, without bargaining or pursuing a compromise solution.[12] Insulation involves an attempt to separate the policy decision from public debate, typically by suppressing opposition or by co-opting the opposition with side payments.

The influence of domestic politics on foreign policy decisions is likely to depend heavily on the type of strategy chosen by a leader for dealing with domestic pressures (Hagan 1993). A leader choosing an insulation strategy domestically is likely to pursue the same policies that would have been pursued without any domestic influence, at least as long as the leader is able to maintain sufficient support to ensure the ratification and implementation of any international agreements and to ensure continuation in political power. Accommodation strategies can reduce the government's policy flexibility and, in extreme cases, immobilize it completely because of the strong pressures for domestic accommodation. A leader choosing such a strategy is likely to accept less commitments or risks in foreign policy (such as might be incurred by threatening or using force against a rival), generally reducing foreign commitments and underreacting to foreign threats. Mobilization strategies, at least when pursued successfully, lead to domestic support and legitimation for the leader and his or her policies, offering much greater flexibility than the other strategies and amplifying the leader's willingness to respond to foreign threats. A leader choosing a mobilization policy is likely to accept more international commitments and risks, perhaps leading to an overextension of the state's capabilities and an overreaction to foreign threats.

An important implication of the two-level game for studying rivalry involves the effects of changing the size of win sets. Internal or external developments that decrease the size of a state's win set should have the effect of making agreement more difficult to reach, thereby prolonging competition and rivalry. Developments that increase the size of the win set should facilitate agreement and help lead to the end of the rivalry.

One factor that Putnam (1988: 442-443) identifies as contributing to the size of win sets is the cost of non-agreement to constituents, because a potential agreement put up for ratification is being compared to no agreement instead of to some specific alternative agreement. The lower the costs of non-agreement to a set of constituents, the smaller their win set should be, because the people have less worries about their situation if the agreement is not ratified. Thus, the size of a win set should be increased by any internal or external developments that raise the costs of non-agreement for domestic actors, perhaps by worsening the status quo to the point where any agreement begins to look better by comparison.

[12] Accommodation and mobilization essentially attempt to modify the size of the domestic win set in order to achieve the leader's preferred goals. Moravcsik (1993) uses the term "cutting slack"for an attempt to expand the domestic win set to accommodate an international agreement that has been signed or is being negotiated. The alternative, "tying hands," is meant to constrict the win set to strengthen the leader's bargaining position in the international game.

A second factor that Putnam (1988: 445) identifies as contributing to the size of win sets involves the effects of politicization. The more politicized an issue becomes, the more likely it is that new domestic political actors will be activated. Putnam suggests that these newly activated actors will be less worried about the costs of non-agreement, thus reducing both the win set and the negotiating flexibility of leaders in the international game. As a result, internal or external developments the politicize an issue are likely to reduce the win set and thus prolong a period of rivalry.

A third factor that Putnam (1988: 450-452) identifies is the strategy of the government's negotiator in the international game. Each negotiator prefers that the adversary have as large a win set as possible, to make a ratified agreement easier to achieve. With regard to his or her own state's win set, though, a negotiator encounters a dilemma. A large win set makes it easier to reach an agreement with the opponent, but with the risk of losing valued stakes in the resulting agreement. A smaller win set increases bargaining power, by allowing the leader to press for a very favorable agreement on the grounds that any other agreement is unlikely to be ratified, but this also carries the risk of preventing an agreement from being signed in the first place. Putnam (1988: 450) notes that an effective way to demonstrate commitment to one's position is to rally support from constituents through saber-rattling. The risk of doing so, though, is that such tactics can change constituents' attitudes irreversibly, impeding attempts to ratify a subsequent agreement (see also Mor 1997; McGinnis and Williams 1993).

Public Opinion., Diversion, and Conflict

Levy (1988, 1998) notes several competing views of the relationship between public opinion and conflict. Political liberals and Marxists typically see public opinion as a pacifying force, restraining leaders from pursuing aggressive policies that might lead to war. According to this view, wars are typically forced on uninterested or unwilling publics by their leaders. Numerous historical examples, though, suggest the opposite effect, with public opinion appearing to pressure political leaders to adopt more hard-line policies than they might otherwise prefer – perhaps going as far as war.

Both perspectives can be consistent with the role of public opinion in a two-level model of interstate rivalry, depending on the relationship between the preferences of the political leadership and of those of the mass public (Mor 1997). The common thread in both perspectives is that the leader adjusts foreign policy to be more closely aligned with public opinion, which the two-level model in this paper suggests is because the leader desires both policy ratification and continuation in political office. Thus, as the liberal/Marxist perspective suggests, a hawkish leader might be restrained by a more dovish public (at least until the leader has a chance to manipulate public opinion in a more aggressive direction). Similarly, a dovish leader may behave aggressively if public opinion favors firm action against a rival and the leader wishes to accomplish some of his or her goals and remain in power.

A more cynical view of the relationship between public opinion (or the selectorate) and conflict is found in the diversionary (or scapegoating) hypothesis. Essentially, this hypothesis suggests that leaders facing domestic (political, economic, or social) troubles can use the appearance of a foreign military threat to create (temporary) domestic unity and divert domestic attention away from the troubles. Aggressive action against an apparent foreign threat may produce a strong short-term "rally 'round the flag effect," although this effect appears to diminish as the operations last longer or generate high casualties and other costs (Levy 1988, 1998; Russett 1989).

As Levy (1998: 154) suggests, a long-time rival adversary would appear to offer the ideal

opponent for scapegoating, because the people are already predisposed to see the rival as a threat. For example, John F. Kennedy's use of the "missile gap" with the Soviet Union in the 1960 presidential campaign and Ronald Reagan's military buildup against the Soviet "evil empire" offer two cases where the threat posed by a rival state appears to have been used for one's own political gain. The connection between rivalry and scapegoating has not been explored systematically, but it has been the subject of speculation. Scholars such as Boulding (1962) and Finlay, et al. (1967) argue that national decision-makers often use an historic enmity to create or maintain the definition or cohesiveness of their nation-state. As Boulding (1962: 162) suggests, a strong enemy is "a great unifying force" and organizations such as states are in many ways "creations of their enemies," achieving internal unity through hatred of a common threat or enemy. Similarly, the literature on nationalism (e.g., Anderson 1991) points out how nationalism and historical enmity can be exploited by leaders to unify, mobilize, or strengthen the state (and their own positions of power, as well) against internal or external threats.

Hypotheses on Domestic Politics and Interstate Rivalry

The above discussion suggests that domestic political actors and processes can play an important role in the origins and development of rivalry. When rivalry is viewed as a two-level game, it becomes clear that a leader faces three distinct threats in attempting to settle the contentious issues making up a rivalry. One threat is that of rejection by the opponent, who can refuse to begin talks or -- if talks begin -- can refuse to reach an agreement. This threat has been recognized by past research on rivalry, which highlights the difficulties in reaching meaningful agreements with a rival; two other threats are unique to the two-level game of rivalry. A second threat involves possible rejection by the leader's domestic constituents, who can refuse to ratify or implement an agreement that is reach with the rival or, ultimately, can remove the leader from political power. A third threat involves rejection by the opponent's domestic constituents, who -- like the constituents in the leader's own country -- can refuse to ratify or implement an agreement or can remove the opponent's leader from power.

The next section of this paper attempts to apply these domestic factors to Hensel's (1996a) primarily international-level hypotheses on the evolution of rivalry, with two particular goals in mind. The primary goal is to reformulate these past hypotheses to reflect the role of domestic politics more explicitly, in order to make the hypotheses more detailed and precise and -- if necessary -- to revise earlier hypotheses for consistency with the general theoretical model. Additionally, this paper's two-level game approach is intended to generate new hypotheses to increase our understanding of rivalry beyond past international-level theoretical approaches such as that of Hensel (1996a).

Rivalry Context

A central tenet of the evolutionary approach to rivalry is that the context of relations between states changes in response to earlier events between those states. This evolution is argued to take two forms: general effects that result simply from the occurrence of past confrontations, and more specific effects that result from specific characteristics of the past confrontations (such as the issues at stake, conflict outcomes, and conflict severity levels). It should be noted that these two types of effects may have opposite influences on future relations between two rivals. That is, while the general effect due to a long history of past conflict may lead to increased hostility between two rivals, specific confrontations may generate decreased hostility, as might be the case for especially severe conflicts or conflicts that ended in a

negotiated compromise that resolved the issue(s) at stake. The first hypothesis to be examined involves this general effect; later hypotheses reflect several more specific effects.

Hensel (1996a) suggests that two adversaries' interactions at any given point in time are influenced by the context of relations between them. That is, in a relationship where the adversaries have been actively engaged in confronting each other for many years, they are likely to have developed certain expectations about each other, and these expectations are likely to exert an important influence on actions taken toward that adversary in the future. On the other hand, in a relationship that has not been marked by the frequent resort to militarized means in the past, the adversaries may not have developed the same expectations about each other's likely future behavior. Specifically, Hensel (1996a) hypothesizes that adversaries that have moved further along the evolutionary scale of rivalry -- i.e., adversaries in the "intermediate phase" or, especially, the "advanced phase" of rivalry -- will be more likely to engage in future conflict behavior in the near future than adversaries in the "early phase" of rivalry, because of their accumulation of hostility and grievances through their past history of conflict.

The logic behind the original hypothesis focuses exclusively on the expectations of leaders; consideration of domestic political actors and processes allows much more fruitful reformulation of these hypotheses on the impact of rivalry context. The "early phase" of rivalry (Hensel 1996a) refers to the period in which two adversaries have only engaged in one or two militarized confrontations. At the beginning of a militarized relationship between two states, the mass public on both sides of the relationship is unlikely to follow events very carefully. A variety of public opinion literature has suggested that foreign affairs are of little consequence to the average citizen, at least until his or her interests are perceived as being threatened. Although the general public is unlikely to be activated politically by events in the early phase of rivalry, a few interest groups may be involved, because they have economic, political, or other interests in the resolution of the issue(s) under contention. In a territorial claim, for example, certain investors may have a financial stake in the disputed territory, because they stand to gain from the agricultural land, oil, minerals, or other known or suspected contents of the territory. Because interest groups rarely have much of a direct influence on foreign policy, and because the mass public is unlikely to be activated politically in the early phase of a potential rivalry, governmental actors should be relatively free from constraints in the early phase.[13]

As two states accumulate a longer history of conflict with each other, Hensel's (1996a) evolutionary approach suggests that their relations are likely to become more hostile and conflict-prone, primarily because of hostility and expectations by state leaders. The domestic elements of the model presented in the paper suggest additional reasons for this increasing hostility. In particular, a longer history of conflict is likely to activate a larger portion of the mass public. In order to maintain a rivalry long enough to reach the intermediate or (especially) advanced phase of rivalry, a government has likely had to mobilize domestic support for policies that might otherwise be opposed for wasting resources and risking (or causing) costly confrontations with the rival. Furthermore, the recent confrontations against the rival are likely to activate the public by creating or magnifying the general perception that personal interests are at stake. Any confrontation that has led to fatalities or to the extended stationing of military forces in harm's way is likely to create such a perception for the soldiers and their friends and families,

[13] To the extent that any domestic actors influence government decisions in the early phase of rivalry, interest groups are likely to be the primary actors involved. Milbrath (1967) suggests that issues that attract the attention of special publics, but that attract little attention among the general public, are more open to group influence than issues that attract intense public scrutiny or debate.

and any domestic social or economic hardships as a result of the budding rivalry are likely to have a similar (if less intense) effect on a wider scale.

The domestic actors discussed in this paper also suggest a new consistency across a variety of hypotheses that have been used to account for the development of interstate rivalry. For example, I have just suggested that rivalry is likely to activate the mass public slowly, as larger segments of society begin to feel that the rivalry affects their personal interests. Certain events may hasten this process, though, activating the public politically before two states have moved through the early and intermediate phases of rivalry by engaging in a series of confrontations.[14] Any factor that activates the public in support of rivalry can thus be seen as contributing to the evolution of rivalry; hypotheses to be examined here include conflict outcomes, conflict severity levels, and specific types of contentious issues.

Conflict Outcomes

Hensel (1996a) cites literature suggesting that statesmen "learn" from history, particularly from prominent events like crises or wars, and that the lessons that they learn often help to shape their images of the former adversary and their interpretation of subsequent events. For example, a past interaction with an adversary – particularly a crisis or war against the adversary -- can lead to "learning" about that adversary's nature or intentions, which may then affect subsequent relations with the adversary. This type of learning may lead to policy change toward rapprochement, as with the effects of the Fashoda crisis, or toward greater enmity and future conflict, as with the Arab-Israeli wars or the wars between France and Germany.

Drawing from the empirical literature on recurrent interstate conflict, Hensel (1996a) focuses on the effects of militarized dispute outcomes on post-dispute relations between the former adversaries. Specifically, dispute recurrence is hypothesized to be less likely following decisive outcomes or compromises than after indecisive, stalemated outcomes. In stalemated disputes, neither side was able to produce the desired changes in the status quo, neither was defeated and rendered unable to mount another serious challenge, and no mutually satisfactory settlement was reached to resolve the two sides' differences.

Again, Hensel's (1996a) original hypotheses involve the attitudes and preferences of national policy makers, focusing on issue disagreement and the status quo. This paper's focus on domestic actors suggests that the impact of dispute outcomes may depend on the number of domestic actors that are activated politically, as well as the preferences of these actors. If most domestic actors are uninterested in the rivalry or the issue(s) under contention, then leaders face few constraints on policy making and they can be expected to react to the dispute outcome without much need to fear loss of political power from an unactivated public. To the extent that domestic actors are activated, either by the outcome itself or by events occurring before the past confrontation, then the impact of dispute outcomes on policy should depend on the preferences of the activated public. For example, an unsuccessful outcome -- in which the state in question lost a confrontation against its rival and the status quo may have worsened due to the loss of territory (or whatever issue is at stake) -- appears likely to activate more of the public by convincing them that the rival poses a serious threat to their interests. A politically activated public that seeks

[14] It should be noted that this conception of events leading to the activation of domestic actors is also consistent with Goertz and Diehl's (1995) notion of political shocks. This suggests another advantage of this paper's two-level model, because Goertz and Diehl's shocks notion was previously seen as opposing Hensel's evolutionary model (see Hensel 1998b).

accommodation with the adversary is likely to restrain a leader from hostile action in the aftermath of the outcome, while an activated public with belligerent preferences is likely to encourage the leader to adopt more hostile policies against the rival.

Conflict Severity

Beyond the effects of dispute outcomes, the severity level reached in a previous confrontation between two adversaries may also affect their subsequent relations. If a confrontation reaches a high level of escalation, the involved nations may need to rearm or replace the loss of much of their military hardware or trained military personnel. Public opinion may develop an aversion to belligerent foreign policies as the result of previous experiences with wars or crises that raised the strong possibility of escalation to war. Either separately or in conjunction with the effects of public opinion, a state's policymakers may develop a similar aversion to war that will lead them to hesitate before seeking to initiate another confrontation, often referred to as a "war-weariness" or "negative reinforcement" effect. A previous confrontation that led to heavy losses could lead policymakers to reevaluate or abandon the policies that led to those losses. Alternatively, a confrontation that ended with few or no losses may contribute to more aggressive foreign policy actions in its aftermath, relative to confrontations that produced heavier losses in men or material. For the above reasons, Hensel (1996a) hypothesizes that the severity levels of past conflict against a given adversary should have important effects on the likelihood of future conflict against that same adversary, with especially severe confrontations leading to a cooling-off period without militarized conflict.

Unlike many of the other hypotheses presented by Hensel (1996a), the hypothesis on conflict severity involves an explicit role for public opinion. The present paper's emphasis on domestic actors also suggests that such a dramatic international event as a full-scale war is likely to lead to the political activation of a large segment of domestic society, because so many people's interests were likely affected by the war. In general, then, the two-level model suggests that especially severe conflicts between two rivals should have the twin effects of activating a sizable portion of the public and generating opposition to such costly conflict in the future. The result should be that the government will be less belligerent in the near future after the war, because of the high political costs of pursuing a belligerent policy that the public is likely to oppose. It is instructive the Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) find that involvement in a costly war increases a government's likelihood of losing political power, whether the war ended in victory or defeat.

Contentious Issues

Beyond characteristics of the last confrontation between two adversaries, characteristics of the general disagreements dividing the adversaries are also important to an evolutionary conception of rivalry. That is, conflict occurs for a reason, and the specific issues or stakes in a given conflict can be seen as an important factor contributing to the course and consequences of that conflict. With regard to recurrent conflict and rivalry, the issues at stake in a confrontation between two adversaries are expected to play an important role in shaping the way that the actors relate to each other, learn from their previous interactions with each other, and develop expectations about the future. Disagreement over stakes that are considered to be highly salient might be expected to lead the relevant policy-makers to adopt a more suspicious or more hostile stance toward their adversary, because the risks or costs of losing the disputed stakes to the

enemy might be too great. More minor stakes, in contrast, might more easily be ignored by policymakers, and are less likely to lead policymakers to accept the risks and potential costs of interstate conflict.

One particular stake that is often seen as possessing a special degree of salience involves territory. Territory can have both tangible material consequences and intangible, psychological importance for both states, which can be argued to make territorial issues perhaps the most salient general type of issue (e.g., Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1996b). For these reasons, territorial disputes often lead to long-standing resentments and desires to recover lost territory, producing more escalatory conflict behavior than non-territorial issues, and being more likely to be the subject of recurrent militarized confrontations. As a result, Hensel (1996a) hypothesizes that militarized conflict is more likely to recur when territorial issues are at stake between two adversaries than when only non-territorial issues are at stake.

Dyads that contend over less salient issues are not expected to be as likely to become involved in recurrent confrontations over these issues. If an early confrontation fails to resolve the issue, the adversaries may be prone to drop the matter entirely without pursuing further conflict over the issue. This expectation is the opposite of what might be expected from highly salient issues such as territory, where the adversaries might be expected to keep pursuing the issue until they have achieved their goals (which may then lead the losing side to continue to achieve its own goals). Vasquez (1993: 151), for example, suggests that unresolved territorial issues are an extremely important factor leading to both rivalry and war, and that few wars or rivalries occur that do not involve territorial issues in one way or another.

From a two-level games perspective, the influence of public opinion -- in terms of domestic constraints on policy makers -- is likely to be greatest when high-intensity issues are at stake (Trumbore 1998). High-intensity issues are likely to involve a wider range of political actors in the policy debate than lower-intensity issues, and are likely to lead to more active involvement in this debate. The intensity of issues is heavily perceptual in nature, with intensity for any given actor depending on that actor's perception of the distribution and magnitude of the costs and benefits associated with the issue. As a result, as more actors begin to perceive that the outcome of negotiations over a particular issue will affect them, that issue will take on higher salience and the actors are more likely to attempt to influence the course and outcome of those negotiations. Given the apparent salience of territorial issues relative to most other issue types, as well as the likelihood that territory is seen as important for large segments of society who live, work, or otherwise depend on the territory, we should expect that territorial issues should be more likely than most other issues to activate large portions of the public and lead to a high level of domestic constraints on policy makers.

Contributions of The Model

The two-level model developed in the present paper offers a number of improvements over past research that has been mostly dyadic in nature. First, the past hypotheses have been reformulated to highlight which domestic actors are involved and how each is involved. The earlier hypotheses were either focused on the chief executives (or unitary governmental actors) in the two rival states, or were left unspecified; domestic actors such as legislatures, the mass public, and opinion leaders have now been added. Second, the past hypotheses have been reformulated with greater detail and precision. The earlier hypotheses on dispute outcomes, for example, attributed a consistent effect to each outcome type, no matter when in a rivalry it occurred or in which type of domestic context. The revised model suggests that the impact of outcomes may depend heavily on the domestic context, with factors such as the political

activation of the mass public appearing to be quite important. It is to be hoped that these more precise predictions of the revised model will provide a closer fit with reality than the more general predictions of the original model.

A third advantage of the present model is that the various factors in the model now fit together more consistently. In the earlier version of the model, dispute outcomes, dispute severity, and contentious issues were described separately. In the current model we see that these different factors all contribute to (and depend on) the political activation of the masses, and we see a more explicit linkage between these specific effects and the general evolutionary relationship covered by the first hypotheses. Similarly, the present model allows for the inclusion of certain types of political shocks in a consistent framework with these evolutionary factors, even though political shocks and dispute-to-dispute evolution were previously seen as parts of opposing explanations for rivalry. In the present model shocks can be seen as another type of factor that can affect political activation and domestic actors' preferences, in much the same fashion as the other factors already included in this model.

Evidence on Domestic Politics and Rivalry

The remainder of this paper attempts to evaluate the theoretical arguments and hypotheses on domestic politics and rivalry that have been developed. Time and resource constraints prevent me from conducting original empirical analyses to compare the current model with the older version that excluded domestic actors. Instead, this section is limited to a plausibility probe of the newly reformulated model and hypotheses, using a brief case study of the rivalry between Bolivia and Paraguay from the late 19th century through the mid-20th century. Hensel (1996a) examines this case (along with the rivalry between France and Germany), but the earlier examination of the role of domestic factors is ad hoc and not based on any specific hypotheses or expectations. The reworking of this case study allows for a more explicit emphasis on the domestic processes and actors discussed in the present paper, in order to see whether these actors and processes appear to have had the expected effects on interactions between Bolivia and Paraguay. In particular, the case studies are examined for evidence on the two types of domestic constraints on leaders discussed earlier, Hagan's twin problems of ratification and retaining political power. Additionally, the cases are examined for evidence on the involvement of domestic actors in foreign policy making, focusing on the role of the mass public and opinion leaders.

The rivalry between Bolivia and Paraguay involved competing territorial claims to the Chaco Boreal region between the two countries. After independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, both states claimed the territory because of incomplete and contradictory Spanish record keeping. By the end of the century, both sides were exploring and colonizing the region. The Bolivian and Paraguayan military patrols began to encounter each other in the 1920s, leading to a number of militarized incidents and failed attempts to settle the competing claims. One set of incidents spawned the bloody Chaco War of 1932-1935, in which Paraguay captured most of the region. After three years of difficult negotiations and renewed incidents in the Chaco, Bolivia and Paraguay agreed to a final settlement of the Chaco that recognized most of Paraguay's gains from the war (for more detail see Hensel 1996a).

Constraints on Leaders: Ratification and Win Sets

The Bolivia-Paraguay rivalry offers many examples of ratification problems, where the Bolivian and Paraguayan leadership signed four treaties over their territorial dispute that subsequently failed to

achieve ratification in one or both countries (Rout 1970). The 1879 Quijarro-Decoud Treaty was ratified by the Bolivian National Assembly with an additional provision, which Paraguay refused to accept. When Bolivia finally ratified the treaty without any reservations in 1886, the seven-year time limit for ratification of the treaty had passed. The 1887 Tamayo-Aceval Treaty was not ratified by Bolivia until late 1888 because of an incident between the Paraguayan military and a Bolivian developer in the Chaco; again the time limit for ratification had passed. The 1894 Benítez-Ichazo Treaty was never ratified by either side. Finally, the 1907 Pinilla-Soler Protocol was quickly ratified by the Paraguayan Congress, but Bolivia demanded modifications that Paraguay found unacceptable, and efforts to revise the protocol ended in deadlock.

Warren (1949: 290-291) notes that the territorial dispute over the Chaco was a powerful justification for Paraguay's political parties -- indeed, providing perhaps the principal issue for Paraguayan opposition parties -- and a strong unifying force holding Paraguay together as a nation. Paraguay's Liberal Party had been founded in 1887 with rejection of the 1887 treaty as a primary goal, but both the Liberals and the Colorado Party exploited the rivalry with Bolivia to their advantage. The Colorado Party was in power for the signing of the 1879, 1887, and 1894 treaties, and the opposition was able to attack each treaty as a measure designed to surrender the national patrimony, leading to the rejection of all three treaties. After the Liberal Party took power in 1904, the Colorado Party was able to assume the role of superpatriotism, and the Liberals found themselves vulnerable to the same chauvinistic arguments they had used recently in opposition to the ruling Colorados (Rout 1970). Similarly, the Bolivian public and opposition complicated the task of producing a peaceful settlement that Bolivia could accept; talks in 1929 ended when Bolivian representatives told U.S. Secretary of State Stimson that "Bolivian public sentiment" made the continuation of the talks impossible (Rout 1970: 31).

In short, the attitudes of domestic actors within both Bolivia and Paraguay appear to have made peaceful settlement very difficult by generating very small domestic "win sets." Putnam (1988) uses the Falklands/Malvinas war between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands to illustrate of the role of domestic win sets in militarized interstate conflict. Putnam suggests that the Argentine and British win sets were very small and did not overlap, as indicated by domestic political rejection in both states of tentative agreements over the islands. As a result, Putnam (1988: 438) concludes, a peaceful negotiated solution was essentially impossible, and war between Argentina and Great Britain became "virtually inevitable." One implication for the study of rivalry is that long-term rivalries are likely to arise when two states' domestic politics offer small win sets for negotiations over some important contentious issue(s) separating the states. In such a situation, the two states' win sets would have little or no overlap, precluding a simple settlement that can be approved in both states.

At least by 1929, the Paraguayan claim to the Chaco and the Bolivian-Paraguayan rivalry had become institutionalized in Paraguayan politics, and the importance of the Chaco to Paraguay's economy left leaders determined to resist Bolivian advances in the region. As a result, Rout (1970: 26) argues that Paraguay had a very small win set: "it is unlikely that any proposal that did not regard as inviolate Paraguay's hold on the Paraguay River and the Hayes Zone had any chance of obtaining approval. The coupling of these conditions with Paraguayan determination to halt Bolivia's penetration into the Chaco meant that by 1929 Asunción's diplomats would appear at the bargaining tables with virtually nothing to bargain."

Bolivia's win set also appears to have been reduced by a history of territorial losses to other

neighbors. Bolivia's protracted inability to achieve its goals in the Chaco was seen in the same light as its earlier defeats by -- and territorial losses to -- Chile and Brazil: as a blow to national pride and the national psyche (Rout 1970; Arze Quiroga 1991). The 1929 treaty settling the Tacna-Arica dispute between Chile and Peru removed all Bolivian hope of recovering the Pacific littoral it had lost in the War of the Pacific, in what leaders called the "final blow" to Bolivian prestige and a humiliation that would never be allowed to happen again (Rout 1970: 27). Bolivia's economy had also been devastated by the loss of all of the country's ports and nitrate mines in the War of the Pacific and the collapse of the world market for tin, Bolivia's only substantial export, after World War I. The Chaco offered the possibility of a route to the sea via the Río Paraguay, and oil had recently been discovered in the Bolivian-occupied portion of the Chaco.

This combination of earlier defeats, economic importance of the Chaco, and what proved to be a protracted stalemate in the Chaco pushed Bolivia's leaders to search for some type of victory, in order to overcome earlier diplomatic and military reverses and reemerge as a respected power. Anything less would be seen as unacceptable, severely limiting the size of the Bolivian win set. As Bolivia's Minister to the United States (Finot 1934: 23) wrote during the Chaco War, "Perhaps if the Chaco dispute had been merely a territorial controversy, Bolivia... might have resigned herself to the loss of her patrimony in order to preserve peace... But the question involved is not only the possession of territories more or less valuable, but also the right to life, the necessity of breathing and of recovering the attributes of an independent and sovereign nation."

Constraints on Leaders: Retaining Political Power

The Bolivia-Paraguay rivalry also offers numerous examples of situations in which a leader was removed from office largely because of perceived foreign policy failures relating to an ongoing rivalry. Paraguay's president during the Chaco War, Dr. Eusebio Ayala, was overthrown by Colonel Rafael Franco in February 1936 because of alleged weakness at the postwar peace table; Franco's government committed itself to a more militant defense of Paraguayan interests (Warren 1949; Rout 1970). Another coup in August 1937 overthrew Franco when military forces in the Chaco refused Franco's decision to withdraw from a strategic road in accordance with suggestions from the Neutral Military Commission overseeing disengagement after the Chaco War (Warren 1949) -- essentially combining the opposition roles of policy ratification and leadership selection.

Bolivia also experienced several changes in leadership due to the rivalry with Paraguay. Bolivian President Daniel Salamanca was widely perceived to have started the Chaco War for personal gain after deceiving the public and overcoming military objections. After a series of Bolivian military defeats in the war, Salamanca lost the widespread popular support that had accompanied the march to war. Twenty thousand rioters demanded his ouster in October 1932, and additional riots accompanied subsequent Bolivian defeats in the war. Finally, the Bolivian army removed Salamanca from power in November 1934, temporarily uniting the country again politically and socially (Klein 1992). Indeed, Klein (1992: 199) notes that by the end of the war Bolivians were so frustrated by poor leadership and military defeat that they were showing much hostility toward their own leaders and surprisingly little hatred toward Paraguay.

Activation of Public Opinion

As suggested earlier, the mass public in Bolivia and Paraguay did not appear to play a major role in the foreign policy process at the outset of their rivalry. Particularly in the 19th century, scholars and national leaders -- typically the educated white elite in a very multicultural society -- may have known about the Chaco Boreal or about Bolivia's claims to the region. The people as a whole, though, neither know nor cared about the Chaco (Warren 1949; Rout 1970). Early Bolivian and Paraguayan inhabitants of the Chaco included small military expeditions, missionaries, and a few foreign settlers and businessmen with economic concessions in the area. Yet even the two governments failed to make a concerted effort to establish undisputed sovereignty in the region until the 20th century, and even then, the average citizen neither knew nor cared about the region.

Several times, domestic or foreign settlers and businessmen in the Chaco -- although primarily interested in their own economic gain -- would prove to be important influences on the preferences and decisions of the Bolivian and Paraguayan governments. A Bolivian developer began building a port on the Río Paraguay in 1885 under concession from the Bolivian government, but Paraguayan military authorities seized his development in December 1887, creating a serious international incident and blocking timely ratification of the 1887 Tamayo-Aceval Treaty. Paraguay granted numerous concessions to American, British, and Argentine businessmen to exploit the Chaco's land and resources for cattle grazing, quebracho timber, and tannin extract, which came to be a vital segment of the Paraguayan economy (as well as important evidence of Paraguayan administration of disputed territory). The importance to Paraguay of revenue from these concessions made the Chaco an asset to be retained at all costs, complicating attempts at a peaceful settlement of the competing territorial claims to the land. Furthermore, Paraguay felt compelled to take a firmer stance in the Chaco once Bolivian expansionism allowed Bolivian military patrols to begin threatening these valuable concessions (Rout 1970). Despite their importance to the Bolivian and Paraguayan governments, though, economic actors appear to have had little impact on the larger public.

To the extent that public opinion became actively interested in foreign policy, this activation generally can be traced to opinion leaders in the form of the political opposition, the mass media, and interest groups. Warren (1949) notes that opposition parties and newspapers on both sides made very effective use of the Chaco conflict by keeping up agitation, supporting their country's claims to the Chaco, rejecting the rival's claim, criticizing perceived governmental inaction, warning against tricks by the rival, and urging military preparation. Similarly, beginning in the 1890s and accelerating in the 1920s, academics and pseudo-academics published numerous well-received books supporting their own country's claims and rejecting those of the rival (Warren 1949; Rout 1970). Rout (1970) notes that the effect of these opinion leaders was to convert geographic barriers like the Río Paraguay into sacred national symbols, and to create a psychological climate in which concession to Bolivia became tantamount to treason.

Public opinion also became activated in response to military incidents during the rivalry. Serious incidents in 1928 and 1931 are described as fixing public attention in Paraguay on the Chaco and inflaming public passions to a dangerous degree, with hotheads demanding war with Bolivia (Warren 1949).

It is difficult to determine exactly how much influence public opinion has had on foreign policy making in past rivalries. None the less, historians' judgments can offer at least some insight into this

problem, even if we must be careful not to accept these judgments as empirical fact. The Bolivian-Paraguayan rivalry offers several examples where -- in the judgment of leading historians -- public opinion seems to have mattered, leading to policy choices that may not have been preferred by state leaders.

One example is the 1931 incident in the Chaco, which gave Paraguay's political opposition a chance to demand action against Bolivia, at a time when the political and military leaders wished to rearm gradually and overlook this one incident. Warren (1949: 299) notes that as negotiators redoubled their efforts to avert war, so did militarists, with a "mob of excited super-patriots" rioting in Asunción to express dissatisfaction with perceived government pacifism. A serious revolt was barely avoided, and the Paraguayan government proceeded to build up its forces and stand firm against Bolivia in the Chaco; full-scale war would result less than a year later.

Beyond the Bolivia-Paraguay rivalry, Mor (1997) notes that public opinion appears to have influenced the timing of the peace initiatives that led to the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Accords. Before 1992, Mor notes that neither the Israeli leadership nor public opinion supported negotiations with the Palestinians; this preference convergence against negotiations ruled out any peace initiative. Public opinion began to change, with a majority in 1992 conditionally supporting negotiations and a majority in 1993 supporting negotiations unconditionally. Very sensitive to public opinion, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin began secret probes of the Palestinian positions in late 1992 to evaluate the conditions favored by the Israeli public, and by mid-1993 Rabin's own preferences appear to have shifted in favor of negotiations. With a newfound convergence of public and leadership preferences in favor of negotiations, Rabin was able to proceed with negotiations and sign the Oslo Accords.

There is also evidence of diversionary behavior during the rivalry over the Chaco. Warren (1949: 291) notes that Bolivia's leaders often attempted to use Paraguayan "aggression" in the Chaco region for their own political gain, suggesting that "there is nothing like a fire abroad to keep a dictator warm at home." Warren identifies Hernando Siles, Bolivian president from 1926-1930, as a notable example of diversionary motivations. A serious Chaco incident in 1928 allowed Siles to repress internal opposition to regime, and generated a surge of patriotism that temporarily united the Liberals, Genuine Republicans, and Saavedrista Republicans behind Siles against the Paraguayan threat (Klein 1992).

Klein (1992) similarly details the diversionary motivations of Daniel Salamanca, Bolivian president from 1931-1934. Salamanca, facing daunting economic, political, and social problems, attempted to overcome these problems with an aggressive foreign policy toward Paraguay in 1931 and 1932. Klein (1992: 183) notes that the Chaco dispute with Paraguay "was an issue he could deal with, confident that the nation would follow him wherever he led them and secure that the Liberals and the radicals could not impede his field of action." Indeed, although elements in the radical opposition criticized his belligerence, most of the liberal opposition and many radicals gave strong support to Salamanca's military buildup and Chaco expansionism. Similarly, when Salamanca chose war in 1932 against the advice of his general staff, he received immediate support from all ends of the political spectrum. Major street demonstrations occurred in every Bolivian city, and Bolivia's economic depression was temporarily forgotten in the wave of patriotism and opposition to Paraguay (Klein 1992). Klein (1992) goes so far as to argue that the principal cause of the Chaco War -- or at least the primary reason for war at this particular point in time -- was Salamanca's reaction to the complex political turmoil and economic depression in Bolivia.

Summary

This brief examination of the Bolivian-Paraguayan rivalry fits very well with the general model presented earlier. The Bolivian and Paraguayan legislatures demonstrate the problems leaders can face with the need for domestic ratification of international agreements, with several treaties rejected that might have been able to end the rivalry. The selectorate in each country demonstrates the problems that leaders face while attempting to remain in political power, with several leaders in each country removed because of their management of the rivalry. Events both inside and beyond the rivalry appear to have reduced the size of both sides' win sets or acceptability sets to the point where agreement was extremely difficult (especially given the above constraints on leaders), which blocked peaceful settlement attempts and prolonged the rivalry. Public opinion and various opinion leaders appear to have played the expected roles, with the mass public being disinterested at the start of the rivalry but (under the influence of the opinion leaders and after major events in the rivalry) becoming a major obstacle to cooperation and peaceful settlement of the disputed issues. Finally, leaders during the rivalry appear to have benefited from diversionary actions, whether intentional (Salamanca) or not.

It must be emphasized that this can by no means be considered a scientific test of the model or its hypotheses. This exercise has not employed rigorous methods of case selection, controlled comparison or process tracing, or evidence evaluation. Yet the elements of the model appear to have played the expected roles in this rivalry, suggesting the importance of domestic constraints on policy making in rivalry. More rigorous analysis -- involving both case studies and large-*N* quantitative analyses -- is now urged to submit this model to a more appropriate test.

Conclusions and Implications

This paper has attempted to introduce domestic politics to the study of interstate rivalry. After reviewing the notion of two-level games and the central domestic actors involved in the foreign policy process, I have reformulated a series of central hypotheses on rivalry from a domestic politics perspective. Although no original large-N analyses are presented, the model is tentatively evaluated through a plausibility probe using the Bolivia-Paraguay rivalry. This case is consistent with a two-level model of rivalry that is centered around domestic influences as well as dyadic relationships.

I conclude with several suggestions on how these domestic hypotheses on rivalry might be tested more directly. One important direction for future testing involves the addition of domestic variables to empirical analyses on rivalry-related phenomena. For example, hypotheses on the role of domestic political constraints on the chief executive can be tested using Polity III data, which measures numerous constraints on executive recruitment and decision making. Similarly, at least for countries whose political processes have been subjected to extensive survey research, public support for the executive might be measured through public opinion surveys and compared to data on interstate conflict behavior. Until such domestic variables are added to the research design, large-*N* analyses will be limited to conclusions that may be consistent with a domestic or two-level explanation of rivalry, but are likely to be equally consistent with an strictly dyadic explanation of rivalry.

Beyond additional quantitative studies, rigorous case studies should be used to examine the role of domestic political factors in more detail. This paper's brief examination of the Bolivia-Paraguay rivalry, along with Hensel's (1996a) examination of the Franco-German rivalry, Nincic's (1989) examination of

the Cold War, Mor's (1997) analysis of the Oslo peace negotiations, and some of the contributions in Evans, et al. (1993), suggest that both major power and minor power rivalries can be affected by domestic factors in systematic ways that are consistent with this paper's general model. Now that this paper has laid out explicit hypotheses on the role of specific domestic forces in rivalry, further case studies should be conducted to evaluate these hypotheses in greater detail. It is to be hoped that the combination of focused case studies with appropriate large-*N* analyses can increase our understanding of the role that domestic factors play in the origins, evolution, and ending of rivalry, either supporting the current hypotheses or reformulating them as necessary.

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