Issue Linkage of Territorial and Identity Claims

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Abstract: States involved in territorial claims may seek to achieve bargaining leverage by linking these claims to other foreign policy issues. Through this issue linkage, claimant states may attempt to persuade their adversaries to start, amend, or halt policies that affect the claimant state's interests, using threats about territorial claims as pressure. We present a theory of issue linkage of territorial claims with identity claims made by states on behalf of ethnic kin living within the target state's boundaries. We argue that when states share both territorial and identity claims, challenger states can use the threat of escalation over the territorial claim to achieve bargaining gains on the identity claim. Using two brief case studies and empirical analysis of a preliminary version of the ICOW Identity Claims data set, we evaluate and find preliminary support for some of our hypotheses.

Issue Linkage of Territorial and Identity Claims

Since 1945, the most acceptable means by which to change the interstate system's borders involve ethnicity, through secession, independence, or irredentism. Thus, ethnicity and the mechanisms for territorial change are intricately linked. Many territorial claims have been justified in the name of territorial links to a shared ethnic or other identity group, but many other territorial claims are justified by histories of prior sovereignty, economic resources, close geographic proximity, and other similar factors. Given the dearth of true "nation-states" – where the identity of the vast majority of citizens overlap with the borders of the state – there have been and likely will continue to be dozens of claims made by governments, mostly against contiguous states, about disputed territory, the treatment of ethnic kin, or both types of claims.

We know from previous research that there are several motivations for territorial claims, which can be intangible or tangible, ranging from lost sovereignty over previously held territory to economically valuable territory or strategic military value. We also know that one of the most difficult types of territorial dispute involves the claim of territory for the purpose of the protection or inclusion of ethnic kin across a border. Yet there are also cases in which a dyad of states disputes territory and also pursues identity claims unrelated to the territorial dispute. For example, Morocco has maintained a territorial claim against Spain since 1956 over two enclaves in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla. Both enclaves have been occupied by Spain for more than 400 years, but Morocco actively contests Spain's ownership due to the geographic location of the enclaves in northern Africa, completely surrounded by Moroccan territory. The citizens of the enclaves are Spanish and not ethnically Moroccan, so ethnic kinship is not the motivation for the territorial claim. At the same time, the Moroccan government has pursued identity claims against Spain regarding the treatment of Moroccan immigrants living in Spain. Though seemingly

unrelated, there is actually a linkage between these two issues, one which we theorize about in this paper.

Overall, we seek to explore the relationship between territorial claims and identity claims. First, how many territorial claims are primarily about identity claims in which a government seeks a territorial claim for the primary purpose of unifying with their kin across a border? Second, under what conditions do states link territorial issues to ethnic issues? Do states pursuing identity claims use territorial claims to bolster their case and weaken their opponents? We suspect that this occurs when an ethnic group constitutes the majority in one state, holds most key government positions in that state, and has a minority group residing in a neighboring state. Under these conditions, the governing (majority) group can easily use a territorial claim against the neighboring state – with the intention of gaining the additional land on which its co-ethnic kin live in that neighboring state. This likely works best when the co-ethnic kin are geographically concentrated (e.g., the Ogaden area for Somalia or the Sudetenland for Germany), as opposed to dispersed. Indeed, this may help explain why ethnic conflict causes ethnic groups to concentrate geographically and establish more homogenous communities (e.g., the movement of ethnic groups during the Bosnian war, 1992-1995). Yet even an unrelated territorial claim can be used for bargaining leverage through linkage to an identity claim for minorities living in other, undisputed parts of a target state.

This paper probes at these questions by presenting some hypotheses about issue linkage between identity claims and territorial claims. We theorize that when disputing states have both territorial and identity claims, challenger states in particular can use territorial claims as bargaining leverage to influence the other states' treatment of ethnic kin. Even if territorial claims are not about irredentism or attempts to seek territory containing ethnic kin, we argue that

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states are able to use their ongoing territorial claims to pressure adversaries to provide improved status or treatment for people with the same identity as the claimant state. The argument is that states can use territorial claims in other parts of the state where ethnic kin are not necessarily living, in order to make bargaining gains on exogenous issues such as identity issues disputed with opposing states, which could likely not have been achieved otherwise. By conducting process tracing in two cases (China-Vietnam and Morocco-Spain), and examining Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) territorial claims data with newly collected ICOW data on identity claims dataset, we find preliminary support for our theory.

The Issue Approach to International Relations (IR)

The issue approach to world politics proposes that state behavior cannot be explained through a state's characteristics or environment alone; rather, the *issues* over which states disagree significantly influence how they behave (O'Leary 1976; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981; Diehl 1992). The critical component for this approach involves identifying the contentious issues that might appear on states' foreign policy agendas including territorial disputes, maritime conflicts, cross-border river disputes, trade disputes, human rights, economic aid, and cross-border identity conflicts (Rosenau 1966; Keohane and Nye 1977; Potter 1980; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981; Randle 1987; Diehl 1992; Hensel 2001; Hensel *et al*. 2008). Rather than seeing foreign policy through a realpolitik lens, the issue approach recognizes that states' foreign policy strategies vary based on the type and importance of the diplomatic issue at stake (Hensel 2001). Furthermore, different groups within a government may seek to handle different foreign policy issues in a diverse way and not with one uniform policy. Because different types of diplomatic issues are valued differently by states, this also means that the degree of salience varies depending on the

issue at stake (Randle 1987, Diehl 1992, Hensel *et al*. 2008). An issue area can be narrow, focusing on something like the eradication of polio, or a much broader issue like international trade, and it can involve tangible (resources, immigration, oceans) or intangible (ideology, prestige, national pride) stakes (Hensel *et al*. 2008).

Territorial and Identity Claims

The ICOW Project developed a general theoretical framework for comparing contested issues beyond territorial claims, including maritime, river, and identity conflicts (Hensel and Mitchell 2017). The core idea of the issue approach is that contentious issues vary in their importance, or salience, and that leaders select different foreign policy tools depending on the salience of the issue at stake. Territorial issues are typically high on both salience dimensions, while maritime and river issues tend to involve much greater tangible than intangible salience (Hensel et al 2008). Identity issues, on the other hand, typically have high levels of intangible salience but low levels of tangible salience. While territorial claims are generally more salient to states (and thus experience the highest risks for militarization), there is considerable variation for salience both within issue areas and across issue claims. ICOW creates a standard scale to capture issue salience across different types of issues, but we have much to learn in terms of the sequencing of different types of diplomatic claims and how states use one issue as leverage for bargaining over other issues.

Territorial claims often involve land that contains economic and strategic value, thereby contributing to the tangible values of wealth and physical security. Furthermore, many territories also take on enormous intangible significance, as they are seen as part of a state's national identity or become tied closely to questions of independence and status/prestige. In addition to or

sometimes instead of making territorial claims that seek to annex territory populated by one's ethnic kinsmen, states today seem to be pursuing culture-based "identity claims," where they make demands on behalf of their kinsmen abroad and offer economic, military, or political support to these kinsmen, but do not seek to annex land. We define an identity (or ethnic) group as a collection of individuals that share "cultural, linguistic, racial, and religious boundaries" (Moore, 2002:78). Identity claims are issues possessing relatively high intangible salience, but low tangible salience. Consistent with existing ICOW data sets, an identity claim is defined as a situation where official government representatives make explicit claims or demands regarding the treatment or status of their ethnic kinsmen in at least one other state.

Substantively such statements might take a variety of forms, including the desire to prevent or end the mistreatment of co-ethnics; to request greater political, economic, or cultural rights for co-ethnics; or to support co-ethnics' demands for local or regional autonomy or political independence. This could be limited to seeking to support their co-ethnics' demands for greater rights or equality, as with Iran's interests in protecting Shi'a Iraqis under Saddam Hussein's rule or Hungary's interest in ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia (there have not been any official claims to these territories since the Cold War ended, but Hungarian leaders have frequently cited concerns about minority rights). Such claims could also go so far as to support the ethnic kinsmen in the latter's effort to achieve autonomy or secession from their current state, as with the current situation of Russian support for ethnic Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine (we have seen no evidence that Russia seeks to annex Ukrainian territory beyond Crimea, but Russia has clearly supported the secessionists) or India's support of Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka under Indira Gandhi.

Our conceptualization of identity claims suggests that these claims primarily involve intangible values, such as culture/ identity, equality/justice, independence, and status/prestige/influence. Outside actors often intervene to help repressed ethnic groups out of a sense of shared identity with the targeted group. Furthermore, these groups are often repressed, which invokes demands for equal and fair treatment of co-ethnics, independence, and a better status within the society in which they live. Identity claims may sometimes involve tangible aspects of salience, as well – particularly aspects relevant for security, survival, or wealth. Russia's interests in Ukraine, for example, are certainly motivated by shared Russian identity. Yet Russia also has territorial and maritime interests in the Black Sea, which were reflected in the territorial claim to and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, as well as border security issues with Ukraine.

Potential interveners can be motivated by primordial ties – such as common culture, language, or religion – as well as by instrumental factors – such as natural resources, regional stability, economic gains, or bargaining leverage. When an ethnic group is in power within the potential intervening state *and* comprises a repressed, minority group challenging the government in a neighboring state, the likelihood of both intervention and conflictual interstate interactions rises (Davis and Moore 1997). Yet by focusing on identity claims - diplomatic disagreements – we track not only those cases where co-ethnic ties lead to intervention and militarized conflicts, but also those cases in which actors claim to speak on behalf of co-ethnics but choose not to intervene. Therefore, it is not necessary for governments to pursue both territorial claims and identity claims, but when they do, it makes for an interesting question about motivations.

A Theory of Issue Linkage

Single issues rarely define foreign policy interactions between neighboring states. With many potential opportunities for cooperation and conflict (Starr and Most 1976), contiguous states sharing territorial, maritime, or river borders are likely to deal with a multitude of issues – ranging from trade, migration, and trafficking to border security. Introduce disagreement over the placement of mutually shared boundaries and the resources that accompany them (e.g., river access), and disputed issues abound. We surmise that two of the most salient issues disputed between states are territorial claims and identity claims, for the reasons outlined earlier. Not only are these disputed issues highly salient compared to other disputed issues (Hensel et al 2008), especially with respect to intangible salience, but they are also often directly or indirectly linked to each other, complicating bilateral relationships and making dispute resolution less likely.

Once multiple issues are under contention, this multidimensional issue competition (Dreyer 2012) can escalate to conflict, prevent the termination of a rivalry, and preclude the resolution of one or all disputed issues. When salient issues are disputed, states often become engaged in lengthy bargaining processes to resolve each salient issue, prolonging the final settlement of all contending claims. Issues may become linked through "issue linkage," preventing the disentangling and resolution of each disputed issue individually. Leaders may fear that failing to demonstrate resolve on one salient issue may invite further challenges on other issues in the future, or states may be hesitant to resolve issues that are relied on as bargaining leverage in relation to other issues. Compromising on an issue may be less likely when multiple issues are at stake due to reputational concerns and fears of the potential consequences of failing to demonstrate resolve. States engaged in territorial claims with more than one state, or in more than one border region (e.g. Argentina-Chile, China-Vietnam, Russia-China), may fear that

giving in to one competitor's demands may invite others to push their own demands, expecting capitulation (Hensel, 1996, 2000; Walter, 2003). Similarly, when adversarial states are engaged in a rivalry, states may fear that demonstrating a willingness to cede to a competitor's demands on an issue may result in challenges from one's rival on additional disputed issues (Dreyer 2010b).

When states maintain two or more issue disputes, governments have the opportunity to link the two disputed issues together, in hopes that bargaining gains can be made on one or both of the issues. Challenger states involved in territorial disputes can use claimed territory to compel the adversary to change its policy or actions toward minority groups with the same identity as the challenger state. By linking the territorial dispute with another disputed issue, the challenger state pursues a strategy of issue linkage in an attempt to achieve bargaining leverage and concessions on the non-territorial issue (Wiegand 2011), in this case identity claims, which we argue here can be more salient than territorial claims.

Issue linkage occurs when a challenger state intentionally links one foreign policy issue with another initially unrelated foreign policy issue, making the claim that "the resolution of one issue or group of related issues will or should affect, or be affected by, the resolution of the other issues or group of issues" (Leeborn 2002, 6). Issue linkage can be a deliberate policy or occur as an ad hoc response to an action by the adversary (Dixon 1986, 430). Rather than merely responding to one issue within that issue area, states pursuing issue linkage bring in another disputed issue, linking the two together. By linking disputed issues, states can offer side payments or concessions in bargaining, providing a better opportunity for dispute resolution (Hoekman 1989).

Sometimes states can link issues substantively, so that issues such as trade and worker's rights logically link together. States can also use issue linkage strategically, with no obvious connection of issue areas (Leeborn 2002). With strategic issue linkage, states can achieve relative bargaining leverage in issue areas where they are relatively weaker. In some cases, strong states will use issue linkage to extend their relative power from one issue area to another. For issue linkage to work successfully, the states involved in the dispute must place different values on the disputed issues, and the proposed linkages must make conditions more attractive than the status quo (Hoekman 1989). This is logical since either state would shift its policies or actions if it did not improve the state's conditions somehow, by gaining concessions or preventing a threatening act from occurring.

Another factor that makes issue linkage more likely to succeed is the relative salience of the disputed issues (Morgan 1990). Some issues like territorial disputes have "mutually-recognized salience…," which "dominate the dyadic relationship" between adversarial states (Dixon 1986, 439). Hensel *et* al. (2008) point out that territory has both tangible and intangible salience, which tends to be highly valued. Deutsch (1973) and Pruitt (1981) suggest that the success of issue linkage depends on the salience or nature of the disputed issues. Issue linkage is more likely to succeed if one of the disputed issues has more relative salience than the other (Morgan 1990). Since territory is considered to be one of the most salient issue in international relations and the issue most likely to cause armed conflict, it is not surprising that challenger states would choose to use territorial disputes as bargaining leverage in other disputed issues like identity claims, in which they lack leverage over opposing states.

States involved in disputes over territory can use the claims as bargaining leverage in negotiations over other disputed issues such as identity claims. By threatening the other state

with regards to its resolve on the territorial dispute, one state can achieve concessions or influence the decision of the other state to pursue a certain strategy with an identity claim dispute. Strengthening resolve on territorial claims can help to strengthen the states' position on identity claims when the states meet at the negotiating table. Thus, states can use stronger resolve on territorial claims in an attempt to make information about capabilities and resolve about identity claims credible, and more importantly, to alter the outcome and terms of negotiations about identity claims.

H1: *Territorial challenger states that have identity claims against target states are more likely to begin military provocations over their territorial claims than those without identity claims.*

Peaceful Management of Territorial Claims

The second aspect of our theory examines how identity claims affect the peaceful, rather than militarized, management of territorial claims. Our theory suggests that states will be more likely to begin negotiations over their territorial claims while an identity claim is ongoing, because of the possibility of bargaining leverage through issue linkage. Beginning negotiations offers an opportunity to influence the treatment of ethnic kin in the target state through the bargaining process, using the territorial dispute as bargaining leverage to signal resolve and achieve bargaining gains on the identity claims. This expectation should only hold, though, for non-binding settlement techniques such as bilateral negotiations, mediation, or good offices. There are too many risks in the submission of the territorial issue to legally binding arbitration or adjudication to justify such techniques as bargaining leverage, as the third party may decide to award the claimed territory to the state's opponent.

H2: *Territorial challenger states with ongoing identity claims against target states will be more likely to begin (non-binding) peaceful negotiations over their territorial claims than those without identity claims.*

Research Design

To test our theory and hypotheses, we use a multi-method approach, first examining two cases in which challenger and target states share both territorial and identity claims, and then analyzing quantitative data on identity and territorial claims. The two cases are China vs. Vietnam in the 1970s, and Morocco vs. Spain in the 1980s and 2000s. The purpose of the cases is to help flesh out the causal story, demonstrating how issue linkage occurs and how territorial claims can be used as bargaining leverage for challenger states to gain concessions on identity claims.

For both methods, we are examining the effect of identity claims on actions involving strategies in territorial disputes. The first measure of our dependent variable is the provocation or escalation of territorial claims by a challenger state against a target state. We measure this variable in two ways, first as diplomatic provocations, and second as militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), including both fatal and non-fatal MIDs. We use the case studies to test the likelihood of diplomatic provocations of territorial claims that are not militarized since such data are currently not available. For fatal and non-fatal militarization, we use the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset. A militarized interstate dispute occurs when one state threatens, displays, or uses force against another state (Palmer et al. 2015). We also examine the peaceful management of territorial claims through bilateral negotiations, non-binding third party techniques such as good offices or mediation, and binding third party techniques such as arbitration and adjudication. These data are provided by the ICOW Territorial Claims conflict resolution dataset.

Our main independent variable of interest is the presence of an ongoing identity claim. This is measured in two different ways: both comparing the impact of any type of identity claim, and distinguishing between identity claims that demand domestic change in the status or treatment of the group in the target state and those that demand the independence of the group from the target state. It is worth noting that identity claims may also be irredentist in nature, with the challenger seeking to annex the territory where the group lives -- but such claims also qualify as territorial claims, so we exclude these cases from our analyses of linkages between territorial and identity claims.

For our quantitative analysis, we use the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) territorial claims data set (Frederick et al. 2017) and a preliminary version of the ICOW identity claims data set currently being collected (Hensel and Mitchell 2017). We begin by identifying all dyads that share at least one ethnic group in the 1946-2001 period, using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data (Vogt et al., 2015) and the related Transborder Ethnic Kin (TEK) data set (Cederman et al., 2010, 2013). These are the only cases that are relevant for evaluating this paper's hypotheses, as we require at least the possibility of a state beginning an identity claim over the status of an ethnic group that it shared with another state.

[Table 1 about here]

With the population of eligible cases determined, we examined each of these dyads to determine which became involved in at least one territorial claim and/or at least one identity claim.[1] Thus far, this data set has identified a preliminary total of 145 identity claims from 1946-

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[1] It must be noted that the ICOW identity claims data set is still in a very early stage of data collection and there will be numerous changes before the final version of the data set is released. At this point, this data set is best regarded as incomplete, and these analyses are best regarded as a starting point for more confident future analysis when the data set is further along.

2017, as summarized in Table 1. Of these 146 claims, 63 involve demands by the challenger state for domestic changes within the target state (typically the granting of greater rights, equality, or autonomy for the ethnic group), 27 involve demands for the independence of the group from the target state, and 55 involve irredentist demands for the transfer of the group from the target state to the sovereignty of the challenger state.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 shows the distribution of territorial and identity claims among dyads that shared at least one ethnic group during the 1946-2001 period.[2] In total, 151 of the 912 dyads (16.6%) had at least one territorial claim during this period, and 96 of 912 (10.5%) had at least one identity claim. Importantly, 61 of the 151 territorial claim dyads (40.4%) engaged in at least one identity claim during this time, which allows us to test our expectation that these dyads may use shared territorial claims as issue linkage and potential bargaining leverage over their identity claim(s).

We control for two characteristics of the territorial claim – the salience of the claimed territory and the amount of recent militarized conflict over the claim (Frederick et al. 2017). Issue salience is conceptualized along two dimensions: 1) tangible salience, which is based on tangible values related to security, survival, and wealth, and 2) intangible salience, which is based on intangible values that derive from notions of culture/identity, equality/justice, independence, and status/prestige/ influence. Recent militarized conflict is measured by the number of militarized disputes that have been fought over the claim in the previous decade, weighted by recency (with the full effect of the dispute occurred in the previous year and the

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[2] Because a given dyad may share numerous ethnic groups, and engage in territorial claims over multiple different territories or identity claims over multiple different ethnic groups, this table only indicates whether a given dyad engaged in at least one claim of each type during the period.

weight declining with each additional year). We also control for two characteristics of the claimants – the relative capabilities of the two states (measured by the percent of total dyadic capabilities held by the challenger state using the COW CINC score; Bremer 1987) and joint democracy (measured by whether or not both states score 7 or higher on the Polity score; Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

Case Studies of Issue Linkage

China v. Vietnam

An examination of the Sino-Vietnamese dispute illustrates the process through which states can link identity claims and territorial claims for the purpose of bargaining leverage. Since the 1970s, there have been several disputed issues between China and Vietnam, including identity claims and several territorial disputes. In addition to a border dispute and disagreement over disputed islands in the South China Sea, both states have pursued identity claims against each other. As the challenger state, China's territorial claims began with a border dispute in 1973 when China reevaluated the security of the previously amorphous border - across which ethnic groups easily crossed – which led to Chinese territorial claims and armed clashes, eventually culminating in the 1979 border war (Dreyer 2010; Kenny 2002; Lo 1989). Another territorial claim against Vietnam erupted in 1974 when China seized control over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, seeking to pre-empt Vietnam's seizure of the same islands after South Vietnam's seizure of the Spratly Islands (Burton, 1978-79; Lo, 1989). The Gulf of Tonkin and islands in the South China Sea were viewed at the time as being important primarily due to speculation concerning the disputed areas' potential oil resources.

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China's identity claims started in the 1970s, involving China's strong opposition to the mistreatment and eventual expulsion of the Hoa group - a Chinese ethnic minority group - from Vietnam (Womack 2006). In the early 1970s, there was a growing suspicion of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam (Lo 1989) due to US President Richard Nixon's visit to China, about which Vietnam was "deeply offended" (Dreyer 2010: 303). The North Vietnamese government attempted to force assimilation of Hoa people – through such actions as the seizing of assets and passports, limiting food rations, mixing Hoa into Vietnamese schools using only the North Vietnamese curriculum, refusing to allow visits to relatives in China, and denying Hoa people employment in the military (Amer 1991; Dreyer 2010) – all with the primary goal of preventing Chinese government influence in Vietnam. Before reunification in 1975, the Hoa had much of the commercial businesses in South Vietnam, and after the reunification, the communist government seized all businesses, particularly hurting Hoa status in the society.

After reunification, the communist government pursued a steady persecution of Hoa people in former South Vietnam, forcing many to flee to China, or as "boat people," refugees to other Southeast Asian states, or eventually to the U.S. and Canada. Daily estimates of refugees flowing from North Vietnam into China numbered 4,000-5,000, but eventually, Vietnam refused exit permits for Hoa attempting repatriation to China. Interestingly, in 1977 Vietnam started to use the identity issue of Hoa repression as bargaining leverage over the border dispute (Dreyer 2010), complicating the issue disputes and linkages. In response to China's increasing claims along the border, Vietnam retaliated in 1977 with a "policy of purification" in which Hoa were expelled along the disputed border, so that China could no longer claim territory using the justification of Hoa people living in those territories (Chen 1987; Dreyer 2010). By 1978, in an attempt to pressure Vietnam to change its policies toward the Hoa people and to stem the flow of

refugees coming into China, the Chinese government closed its border with Vietnam. This led to further numbers of boat people, estimated at 100,000 by the end of 1978. The Vietnamese military engaged in armed clashes with refugees, forcing them to try to flee across the now closed border with China, forced seizure of all property, and extortion of taxes and fees to leave the country, which totaled an estimated $242 million in 1978, the largest flow of income for the Vietnamese government. All of this led to official identity claims by China against Vietnam in 1978 (Benoit 1981; Cima 1989; Dreyer 2010).

China overtly linked the disputed issues when it used the border dispute as leverage against Vietnam over identity claims that resulted from mistreatment of its Chinese residents and expelling ethnic Chinese from disputed border areas, intensifying hostility between China and Vietnam (Chen 1987; Hoa and Turner 2010). The multiple claims that required dispute resolution continued to endure and each state increasingly began to link the issues with each other, as well as other disputed issues, including a Soviet alliance with Vietnam and Vietnam's interests in Cambodia (Ross 1988). In addition to the territorial and identity claims, China was particularly concerned about ensuring that Vietnam stay out of influencing or controlling Cambodia and Laos, as well as preventing Soviet influence on this issue.

Issues increasingly became linked with one another, making it difficult to disentangle and resolve the disputes. With multiple issues on the agenda, China was able to pursue a strategy of issue linkage for bargaining leverage, seeking to use the border dispute to its advantage, partially to push for its identity claim of better treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. Chinese leaders would not link the border and territorial dispute with the Vietnam issue until later, but eventually, the issue linkage would become explicit and direct. Militarized disputes along the border increased in frequency and intensity leading up the Sino-Vietnamese War. Following

Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, in February 1979 China initiated war fearing the consequences of failing to demonstrate resolve in relation to an issue under contention while engaged in multidimensional issue conflict. Through massive cross-border raids and attacks, China hoped to compel Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia and to improve the treatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam.

The border dispute consequently became linked to the competition concerning spheres of influence within the region and the identity claim. The war, which was allegedly fought as a border claim, was really more about bargaining leverage and punishment of Vietnam about "the Vietnamese alliance with the Soviet Union, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, Vietnam's mistreatment and expulsion of ethnic Chinese, and territorial disputes" (Womack 2006: 192). As noted by Dreyer (2010), "although territorial issues came under contention between China and Vietnam during the period under investigation, competition over territory was not the primary reason for the Sino-Vietnamese war." Rather, China's territorial claim along the border was of "secondary importance" (Kenny 2002:53). Another scholar noted about the border war, "slight differences in interpretation of the actual alignment of the boundary markers did not impinge on vital interests of both parties to a degree that would initiate conflict. Military disputes over isolated hills continued after the Chinese incursion [in 1979] but these have been of tactical not strategic significance"'" (Lim 1984).

Given that China was seeking to benefit by using the border dispute to its advantage in relation to other issues including the identity claim, China had little incentive to settle the territorial dispute. Chinese leaders admitted that the border war was pursued to pressure Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, improve treatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam, and to punish Vietnam for allying with the Soviet Union. As evidenced by the historical record, there is

no doubt that China deliberately linked the border dispute with its identity claim for the Hoa people. The border dispute continued to endure and was not peacefully resolved until December 1999, eight years after normalization of bilateral relations, and 20 years after the Sino-Vietnamese War.

Morocco-Spain

Morocco has also frequently used a territorial claim against Spain for the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in northern Africa as bargaining leverage to gain concessions on apparently more salient issues, including payments by Spain for fishing rights off the coast of Morocco and an immigration dispute, starting as early as 1987. In January 1987 King Hassan took advantage of a visit to Morocco by the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Jose Barrionuevo, and requested a message to be given to King Juan Carlos calling for a joint commission, or think-tank as he called it, to discuss sovereignty of the enclaves. Despite Spain's refusal to consider the creation of such a commission, Moroccan officials continued to press for their claim throughout the year, and yet again "the Spanish government found that the temperature between Madrid and Rabat had been raised by the Moroccan sovereign seizing opportunity to exploit an apparently routine visit by a Spanish minister" (Gold 2000, 8).

The timing of the proposed commission, perceived by Spanish officials as a claim for the enclaves, as evidenced by a February 1987 speech by Spanish Prime Minister González referring to the enclaves in his State of the Nation, was not random. The claim was not targeted just as acquisition of the enclaves, but also as a means to make bargaining gains on other disputed issues, immigration issues and Spanish fishing rights in Moroccan waters. Part of the reason why Barrionuevo had come to Morocco for talks was due to violent clashes in Melilla that occurred

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from January 31 to February 2 involving the Spanish civil guard, flown in from Spain, and the minority Muslim population seeking improved rights denied to them in a 1985 Spanish immigration law. As a result of these clashes and the subsequent talks, King Hassan linked the claim to the enclaves with the treatment of Muslim minorities, demanding improved rights on their behalf.

Another example of issue linkage of identity and territorial claims occurred in 2000-2001. At this time two bilateral disputes between Spain and Morocco came to the forefront. The first was when Spain called on Morocco to step up its efforts to halt organized rings that allowed for illegal immigrants to cross the strait into Spain, blaming Morocco for not taking enough action to halt such movements. At the same time, Morocco issued an identity claim, complaining about the expulsion of undocumented immigrants from Spain. In May 2000, Moroccan officials protested to Spanish officials about the poor treatment of Moroccan migrant workers in Spain, hoping that President Jose Aznar would address the concern. At a meeting that occurred the same month when Aznar visited Morocco, Moroccan Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi raised the issue of the disputed enclaves, reiterating Morocco's claim yet again, this time describing the Spanish occupied enclaves as dangerous for illegal immigration and Morocco's economy. According to one observer of Spanish-Moroccan relations, "Youssoufi's intervention regarding the enclaves hardly came as a surprise, but there is no doubt that he was more interested in the measures being taken by Spain to protect Moroccan migrant workers, control illegal immigration and assist with his country's underdeveloped northern region than he was with any action relating specifically to the enclaves" (Gold 2000, 30).

By early 2001, Spanish authorities had increased arrests of illegal immigrants significantly. In the first eight months of the year, approximately 8,500 illegal Moroccan

immigrants had been arrested in Spain (*Agence France Presse* 2001). Relations had worsened

significantly by April 2001 not only because of the immigration issue, but also because Spain

was threatening retaliation against Morocco for its refusal to renew the fishing agreement, which

had led to the unemployment of 25,000 Spaniards (*Deutsche Presse Agentur* 2001). By

September, bilateral relations had deteriorated significantly due to the exchange of accusations

about illegal immigrants to the point that the daily *El Pais* claimed that "all of Spain's problems

have their origins in Morocco," which King Mohammed VI rebuffed with his own identity claim

about treatment of Moroccans in Spain (*El Pais* 2001a, 3) and that "the level and tone of the

dispute is rising dangerously" (*El Pais* 2001b). In the midst of the immigration crisis, Morocco

ceased ongoing negotiations over Spanish fishing rights as well.

As a result of accumulated disputed issues – identity claims, fishing rights, and Spanish

support for Western Sahara, Morocco withdrew its ambassador from Madrid at the end of

October 2001 and postponed a summit meeting scheduled for December 2001 (*El Pais* 2001c).

Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohamed Benaissa made a direct link between the enclaves dispute

and the reasons for withdrawing the ambassador. Accusing Spain of taking an aggressive stance

regarding bilateral relations, Benaissa simultaneously reiterated Morocco's claim to Ceuta and

Melilla, calling them occupied cities and questioning Spain's sovereignty. According to a

Spanish news daily, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs was "particularly critical of the

conduct of Spain regarding matters over which the two countries have been most divided in

recent years, and also questioned the Spanish sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla" (*El Mundo*

2001). Similar to the China-Vietnam case, this case illustrates the complexity of multiple

disputed issues between states, particularly how states can use issue linkage between territorial

claims and identity claims for the purpose of bargaining leverage. Morocco effectively linked its

territorial claim for the enclaves with its identity claim for better treatment of Moroccans living in Spain, along with other disputed issues. The dispute remains unresolved to this day.

Quantitative Analyses

We now turn to logistic regression analysis that seeks to understand the conditions under which territorial claims become militarized, the likelihood of dispute resolution, and the likelihood of new identity claims. While the case studies examined the likelihood of diplomatic provocations, as well as MIDs, we quantitatively test whether MIDs, both non-fatal and fatal, are likely with both territorial and identity claims. When multiple issues are at stake between the same adversaries, there may be more motivation to begin militarized conflict over one of the issues in order to influence bargaining over the other; in other words, a demonstration of resolve related to one issue may carry currency in negotiations over the other. Table 3 shows the results of analysis of Hypothesis 1, examining the likelihood that the involved states militarize their territorial claim, focusing as well on the outbreak of a fatal militarized interstate dispute (MID) over the claim, controlling for territorial salience, recent fatal conflict, relative capabilities, and joint democracy.

[Tables 3 and 4 about here]

We begin with analyses of any militarized conflict over the territorial claim, which could range from the threat or display of force to full-scale invasions of the territory. Neither type of identity claim used in this analysis -- demands for domestic change in the status of the shared group or for the group's independence -- has a statistically significant impact on claim militarization, nor does a combined variable indicating whether either type of claim was ongoing at the time. It is worth noting that demands for domestic change are somewhat less likely to lead

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to militarization, with Table 4 showing a nearly 60% decrease in the likelihood of conflict when such demands are being made than when there is no identity claim, while demands for group independence are associated with a roughly 15% increase in conflict -- but neither effect is significant (p<.25 for domestic demands, p<.65 for independence demands). Consistent with past research (e.g., Hensel 2001; Hensel, et al. 2008), the strongest influences on claim militarization are the salience of the claimed territory and the amount of recent armed conflict over the claim.

Table 3 also examines the more severe subset of militarized disputes that produced battle-related fatalities, to determine whether challenger states are more willing to use such escalation for bargaining leverage over identity claims. One finding of note is that identity claims that involve demands for domestic change within the target state have *never* been accompanied by a fatal dispute over an ongoing territorial claim.[3] In contrast, identity claims that involve demands for the independence of the group produce a statistically insignificant increase in conflict behavior (p<.17). Again, territorial salience and recent conflict are the strongest predictors in the model.

Neither form of militarized conflict offers systematic support for our hypothesis about territorial claim militarization for bargaining leverage, but it must be remembered that this is a very preliminary test using very preliminary data. We estimate that at least one third of the identity claims that will appear in the final data set when it is completed have not yet been identified, and that these missing cases primarily involve the two types of demands being studied in this paper; the ICOW Territorial Claims data set has already allowed us to identify the vast majority of irredentist demands in identity claims because of the overlap between such demands

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[3] As a perfect predictor, we therefore remove the variable from the model.

and territorial claims. We do not yet have information on the salience of the identity claims in the data set, and that -- as discussed earlier -- past research on issue linkage suggests that the relative salience of the two issues may be an important influence on issue linkage attempts. We also do not yet have information on attempts to manage the identity claims in the data set, which would allow us to determine whether attempts to use the territorial claim for bargaining leverage are successful in changing the behavior of the target state in the identity claim.

[Tables 5 and 6 about here]

Table 5 reports the results of our analyses of peaceful efforts to manage territorial claims. One important finding, consistent with the caveat in our hypothesis, is that legally binding settlement techniques were never used on territorial claims while an identity claim was ongoing. The results for the impact of identity claims on both bilateral negotiations and non-binding third party activities are much stronger than they were for claim militarization. Demands for domestic change do not have a systematic impact on bilateral negotiations ($p<.68$) but do produce a borderline significant increase in nonbinding third party activities ($p<.07$). Demands for group independence from the target state increase bilateral negotiations ($p<.10$) and non-binding third party activities ($p<.03$), and the aggregated measure that combines both categories has an even stronger effect ($p<.02$ bilateral, $p<.001$ non-binding).

Table 6 reveals that identity claims have a major substantive as well as significant impact. When an identity claim is underway, bilateral negotiations over the territorial claim are 90.9% more likely, and non-binding third party activity such as mediation is 149.0% more likely. This is very consistent with our second hypothesis, and suggests that states involved in territorial claims are quite likely to attempt to link the issues through negotiations. As noted earlier, of course, we currently lack the more detailed information about identity claim salience and about

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identity claim management and outcomes that we would need for a more complete understanding of the impact of this apparent linkage, but this is a promising sign considering the preliminary nature of the data used here.

Conclusions

As we continue collecting data, we suspect that our future research will develop the project in three meaningful ways. First, the form issue linkage takes remains somewhat unclear. We proposed that states use territorial claims to gain leverage in their identity claim disputes. Case research demonstrates that this is an empirical possibility, and some of our quantitative analysis was supportive of this particular linkage -- particularly with respect to peaceful negotiations that would allow for bargaining leverage through issue linkage. Future analyses might consider how territorial claims affect the timing, duration, and termination of identity claims (to address our original proposition directly); how issue linkage affects conflict management within claims (e.g., negotiations); whether sequencing occurs between claim onsets and management behaviors (e.g., do concessions on one issue produce movement on the other); or if no such linkage exists. As we gather and refine more data, these tests will become possible.

Second, territorial claims are linked to certain types of identity claims. Independence movements, for example, seek permission for ethnic kin to break from the target government, while irredentist claims demand a change in sovereignty from the target to the challenger of the claim. In contrast, demands for better domestic treatment of ethnic kin preserve the territorial status quo. Our future research will aim to distinguish more (when possible) between the identity and territorial claim components where tight links exist (e.g., independence identity claims) and to exploit the difference between identity claims with territorial and non-territorial dimensions.

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The latter offer significant leverage for understanding the differences in how states manage

territorial and non-territorial issues – the original purpose of our project.

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Table 1: Very Preliminary Summary of Identity Claims, 1946-2015

Type of challenger demand in claim:

Region	Domestic	Indep.	Irredentism	Total
Western Hemisphere	1	0	0	1
Europe	34	5	17	56
Africa	14	11	14	39
Middle East	8	7	5	20
Asia	6	4	19	29
Global Total	**63**	**27**	**55**	**145**

Table 2: Territorial and Identity Claims in Dyads Sharing Ethnic Groups

Did Dyad Experience 1+ Territorial Claim?	Did Dyad Experience 1+ Identity Claim?		
	No	Yes	Total
No	726	35	761
Yes	90	61	151
Total	816	96	912

Table 3: Identity Claims and Territorial Claim Militarization

A. Any MID

Variable	Model 1: Coeff. (SE)	Model 2: Coeff (SE)
Identity claim:		
Domestic change	- 0.91 (0.78)	--
Independence	0.14 (0.31)	--
Either type	--	- 0.01 (0.29)
Territorial Salience	0.07 (0.03)**	0.07 (0.03)**
Recent Conflict	1.01 (0.07)***	1.01 (0.07)***
Challenger Cap.s	- 0.34 (0.23)	- 0.33 (0.23)
Joint Democracy	0.02 (0.18)	0.02 (0.18)
Constant	- 3.99 (0.31)***	- 3.97 (0.31)***
N:	5116	5116
LL:	-842.82	-843.66
X^2:	209.10	207.42
	(6 df, p<.001)	(5 df, p<.001)

B. Fatal MID

Variable	Model 1: Coeff. (SE)	Model 2: Coeff (SE)
Identity claim:		
Domestic change	--[†]	--
Independence	0.52 (0.37)	--
Either type	--	0.45 (0.37)
Territorial Salience	0.11 (0.05)**	0.11 (0.05)**
Recent Fatal Conflict	1.20 (0.15)***	1.21 (0.15)***
Challenger Cap.s	- 0.70 (0.39)*	- 0.70 (0.39)*
Joint Democracy	- 0.45 (0.36)	- 0.46 (0.36)
Constant	- 5.02 (0.52)***	- 5.02 (0.52)***
N:	5116	5116
LL:	-374.83	-375.02
X^2:	74.38	74.00
	(5 df, p<.001)	(5 df, p<.001)

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
[†] No fatal MIDs occurred during an identity claim demanding domestic change in the target state, so this variable had to be omitted from the model.

Table 4: Marginal Impact of Identity Claims on Territorial Claim Militarization

A. Predicted Probability of (any) MID

	Model 1	Model 2
Baseline (no identity claim)	.035	.035
Identity claim-domestic change	.014 (-58.9%)	--
Identity claim-independence	.040 (+14.8%)	--
Identity claim-either type	--	.035 (-0.8%)

B. Predicted Probability of Fatal MID

	Model 1	Model 2
Baseline (no identity claim)	.012	.012
Identity claim-domestic change	--	--
Identity claim-independence	.021 (+66.2%)	--
Identity claim-either type	--	.019 (+56.0%)

Table 5: Identity Claims and Peaceful Territorial Claim Management

A. Bilateral Negotiations

Variable	Model 1: Coeff. (SE)	Model 2: Coeff (SE)
Identity claim:		
Domestic change	0.23 (0.56)	--
Independence	0.52 (0.31)*	--
Either type	--	0.67 (0.27)**
Territorial Salience	- 0.09 (0.03)***	- 0.09 (0.03)***
Recent Fatal Conflict	- 0.85 (0.34)***	- 0.86 (0.34)**
Challenger Cap.s	- 0.90 (0.21)***	- 0.91 (0.21)***
Joint Democracy	1.50 (0.14)***	1.52 (0.14)***
Constant	- 2.24 (0.25)***	- 2.26 (0.25)***
N:	5116	5116
LL:	-928.65	-927.64
X^2:	163.30	165.31
	(6 df, p<.001)	(5 df, p<.001)

B. Nonbinding Third Party Activities

Variable	Model 1: Coeff. (SE)	Model 2: Coeff (SE)
Identity claim:		
Domestic change	0.93 (0.50)*	--
Independence	0.77 (0.349)**	--
Either type	--	0.94 (0.30)***
Territorial Salience	- 0.15 (0.04)***	- 0.15 (0.04)***
Recent Fatal Conflict	0.17 (0.27)	0.19 (0.27)
Challenger Cap.s	- 0.57 (0.30)*	- 0.61 (0.30)**
Joint Democracy	0.49 (0.23)**	0.48 (0.23)**
Constant	- 2.57 (0.33)***	- 2.52 (0.33)***
N:	5116	5116
LL:	-532.18	-533.64
X^2:	35.92	33.02
	(6 df, p<.001)	(5 df, p<.001)

Table 6: Marginal Impact of Identity Claims on Territorial Claim Management

A. Predicted Probability of Bilateral Negotiations

	Model 1	Model 2
Baseline (no identity claim)	.029	.028
Identity claim-domestic change	.036 (+25.5%)	--
Identity claim-independence	.048 (+65.0%)	--
Identity claim-either type	--	.054 (+90.9%)

B. Predicted Probability of Nonbinding Third Party Activities

	Model 1	Model 2
Baseline (no identity claim)	.017	.017
Identity claim-domestic change	.043 (+147.6%)	--
Identity claim-independence	.037 (+111.5%)	--
Identity claim-either type	--	.043 (+149.0%)